

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY ITS SECURITY COMPULSIONS 1970-80

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(D.D. KHANNA)

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
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INTRODUCTION

The global politics in the post-Second World War era was marked by the bipolarisation of powers. Two centres of powers that emerged were the USA and the USSR, non communist and communist centres of powers. A major part of the international community joined one of the two power centres. The post-World War Two period is a history of power-rivalry between these two antagonistic blocs. This struggle for power for the sake of supremacy in the international affairs engulfed most of the global system including South Asia.

India, a big South Asian nation with enormous power potentials, after obtaining independence adopted non-alignment as the basis of her foreign policy. This policy of non-alignment ran counter to US policy of military pacts. This diversion in the concept of policies to serve national security became a bone of contention between USA and India, whereas Pakistan fell in line with American concept of military pact-system. Through Pakistan USA gained ground to fight the spread of communism in South Asia. Thus, Pakistan became a frontline state in the strategic calculation of the United States. Pakistan also being suspicious of India's power potentials wanted a permanent politico-military support of the United States for maintaining a power-balance in the sub-continent. This

situation and the establishment of military dictatorship in Pakistan ensured continuous arms aid and military support to her from America. This was the basic security compulsion before non-aligned India which started in early fifties and continued further. Out of her own strategic and security compulsions India developed relationship with the People's Republic of China. Panch Sheel agreement was signed between the two countries in May 1954.

With the Chinese aggression of 1962 the scenerio changed. The whole of the northern land frontier turned into hostile frontier. India found herself confronted by hostile neighbours, Pakistan on the west, China in the north and East Pakistan on the east. The successful efforts by Pakistan to have close relations with China added new dimensions to Indian security compulsions.

USSR continued to adopt a neutral posture as far as Sino-Indian conflict was concerned. To her India was a 'friendly non-communist country' but China was 'communist fraternal country'. Out of her security compulsion India now turned to USA for her immediate arms need during the conflict. USA did rush arms supply to India but it could not continue for a long due to political strings attached to it. On the other hand due to vital US interest vested in Pakistan USA increased arms aid to her thus trying to create an artificial power-balance between India and Pakistan.

This Sino-US support to Pakistan encouraged her for initiating aggression over India in September 1965. India, however, managed to defeat the aggression. Its aftermath came forth in the form of increased Indo-Soviet relationship with the signing of Tashkent agreement in January 1966. But Russian policy to wean away Pakistan from American influence by giving her arms and other assistance posed a fresh compulsion before India and she tried to neutralize it through diplomatic channels.

The 'Nixon Doctrine' which aimed at cutting India to size, undermining Russian influence in the region and building up relations with communist China through Pakistani efforts. In perception of this Sino-US-Pak equation in making India started the foreign policy operation in late sixties on pro-Russian lines.

In the background of this strategic scenario it has been observed that security compulsions on India arose out of the actions and policies pursued by USA, USSR, China and Pakistan. The subject 'India's Foreign Policy'. Its Security Compulsions 1970 - 80 has been analyzed in this light.

The thesis has been divided into six chapters for better understanding and analysis of the theme.

Chapter II deals with accepted concepts regarding security and making of foreign policy and tries to establish close linkage between foreign policy and security. The chapter in general deals with determinants, objects execution and means of the security and foreign policy functions as per accepted concepts.

Chapter III deals with the circumstances and security compulsions under which India formulated the policy of non-alignment. It surveys the compulsions faced by India from time to time and India's adjustment and re-adjustment in the formulation and functioning of non-alignment.

The Chinese aggression of 1962 imposed various sets of compulsions on India's security thinking. India's reaction and action taken to meet such compulsions have been discussed in the Chapter IV. The Pakistani invasion of 1965 likewise added to security compulsions. India's adjustment or reformulation of foreign policy in the light of such compulsion has been analyzed. Effort has been made to examine the adequacy of these new formulation and policies to meet the compulsions imposed, have also been examined.

Chapter V deals with the security compulsions from 1971 to 1976. Infact, the year 1971 was the turning

point in the history of India's foreign policy practice. The Sino-US-Pak axis created serious implications for country's national security. In the wake of the compulsions arising therefrom foreign policy required an immediate shift to meet the inherent security needs. This shift is noticable in a timely response to the strategic situation in the sub-continent in the signing of Friendship treaty with USSR in August 1971. The working of the treaty and the dynamism of non-alignment has been examined.

Chapter VI gives an account of the Janta foreignpolicy from the year 1977 to 1980. Although the thirty years old congress regime was voted out of power, yet, the Janta Party - a combination of different ideological groups coming to power, however, retained the basic postulates of India's foreign policy. An attempt has been made to high light the security compulsions during this phase which basically influenced the foreign policy decisions by the Janta Government. It is obvious that the Janta Government did not perceive the security compulsions in a different light than the Congress Government. Therefore, no marked difference is seen in the foreign policies of the two Governments. The emphasis of the Janta Government on 'genuine non-alignment' remained as a slogan for public consumption but the working remained the same.

Last chapter tries to conclude the main findings arising from the compulsions imposed by various events, military and political which took place between 1970 to 1980.

FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY

CONCEPT

The human civilization, since its inception, has been representative of human behaviour. A man, by nature being social, enters into relationship with others in view of his wants and needs. He adopts certain norms and through which he decides a proper course of action to deal advantageously with other members of the society. Similarly, no state can live in isolation from other states and, therefore, it decides certain norms and according to which it follows a particular pattern of behaviour to deal with other members of the international community with the object of gaining maximum in terms of national interest.

So far the independent existence of a state is concerned, it depends upon several important aspects, e.g., internal stability, economic and industrial strength and an adequate security system. Almost all these aspects are closely related with the foreign policy of a state which it formulates to conduct its behaviour in the international system. And in order to behave autonomously an actor must have an independent capacity to solicit and receive information, to process and refine it, and finally to respond to it. This sequence constitutes decision-making¹, or it can

be said that foreign policy decisions are made in response to events and problems that have occurred or are anticipated in the world environment².

Further, the term foreign policy has been defined as principles and practices that 'regulate the intercourse of a state with other states... and almost every moment of its existence, it must define its attitude to other states'³. It, however, indicates towards a 'system of activities'⁴ to change the activities of other states in the international community so as to adjust one's own. Therefore, in the simple analysis foreign policy represents 'a system of activities or setout principles to guide the international action of a state or an ideology defined to serve.... a way of life'⁵ or certain international norms or a particular pattern of behaviour. The priority in the functioning of foreign policy of every country deals 'first with the preservation of its independence and security and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests'⁶. Thus multiplicity in the treatment of the concept proceeds towards solidifying the hard fact that foreign policy denotes a pattern of behaviour adopted by a state to deal with other states in the international system with an ultimate object of achieving, maintaining or maximizing the national interests.

A foreign policy once adopted may not always cope with the circumstances which go on arising from time to time in the global environment. Hence, orthodox and rigid

attitude must be avoided. 'The global relationship is a changing phenomenon, the foreign policy in a complex and changing world must be changing and adaptive'⁷. Since the global political environment keeps on changing the foreign policy of a state can be called adaptive only when it seeks to accommodate itself according to that changing pattern in view of the immediate national interests.

The complex global relationship today, has widened the sphere of foreign policy. The foreign policy does not rest at decision-making only. It also presents a plan of action for implementation. 'Broadly speaking the foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some applicable extent relations between one state and others'⁸.

DETERMINANTS

The 'foreign policy of a state is inevitably shaped by a variety of factors, e.g., geographic and strategic considerations, historical and traditional policies, the general international situation, internal political problems, the elements of economic strength and weakness within the state, the morale of the people and character of the leadership and other equally basic conditions'⁹. In the observation of Black and Thompson, 'the multiplicity of factors which might be classed as determinants are - history, geography, natural resources, industrial development, leadership and diplomacy'¹⁰

The distinguished authors may seem to differ in terminology but in essence both are of the same opinion as to the determinants by implication. Hence, we arrive at an acceptable list of main determinants of foreign policy as under:

The geo-strategic and geo-political factors, material factor, human factor, internal political factor, global factor, constitutional factor and the moral factor.

1. GEO-STRATEGIC AND GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS:

Geographical location of a state is the primary factor which shapes its foreign policy. 'The foreign policy process is a mechanism for the adaption of the political system to its geographical environment and for imposing a measure of control upon the environment in order to achieve the goals of the system'¹¹. The location of a state greatly influences the geo-strategic and geo-political considerations in the formulation of foreign and domestic policies. If a state is land locked it will set its pattern of international behaviour in a different way than a state which is not land locked. A land locked country, of necessity, has to seek goodwill of its immediate neighbours that render it land locked. Whereas a country like Great Britain or USA, which has open seas around it, has little to bother about such

good-will. Britain due to her maritime power, enjoyed the status of a world power and performed her role as a balancer for about two centuries. USA acts as a super power in the international system by virtue of her geographical location enjoying the maritime options. Similarly countries having both land and sea frontiers will have to consider the foreign policies from different stand points.

Size and space of a country also have its strategic, political and economic compulsions in formulating policy. A vast area contributes to the national power through agricultural and other resources provided nature has been kind in bestowing natural resources. It offers a capacity to the state to pursue the policy objectives with greater confidence. If Indian sub-continent is taken as an example the factor of size and space is better illustrated by comparative study of India and Pakistan. India enjoys a space of 12,69,339 Sq. miles whereas Pakistan has only 3,10,403 Sq.miles. Thus, India will enjoy a freedom of strategic manoeuvrability over Pakistan. A spacious country can safely plan the establishment as well as deployment of its military installations and bases, in peace or in war, in the innermost part so as to keep them out of enemy's probable range. In World War II the vast Russian space was mainly responsible for the defeat of German forces. A country with vast space can afford the temporary loss of some territory without suffering

psychological demoralization whereas a country with smaller space can hardly afford such loss during war.

MATERIAL FACTOR

'Resources are important because a too ambitious or highly imaginative foreign policy will fail if it is not sustained by adequate resources'¹². The material resources contribute to the economic power of a state. Its industrial infrastructure is dependent upon various resources and raw materials available in the state, such as water, power resources, minerals, forest products as well as agricultural production. These are the basic factors that contribute to a country's economic power. An economically strong state may counteract the undue pressure over its foreign policy and act independently without any sting.

One of the compulsions that contributed in the formulation of India's non-aligned policy after independence was that India, at that point of time, was not self-sufficient economically and industrially. Her first concern was to concentrate over achieving the economic solidarity and industrial strength by making full use of the resources available at home and abroad. The power potential must be converted into actual power through science and technology and leadership and this actual power must be so distributed

or concentrated so that it is available for actual use at the required place and time to a state. For, the actual availability of power has greater bearing in the efforts of implementation of policy.

MILITARY POWER

Military power always played an important role in the foreign policy of a state. The achievement of the desired objectives through foreign relations gain greater credibility if the external policy has behind it an effective military strength at home. A military power in the community of nations of today has a voice that it generally respected. India's policy of peace and cooperation and her voice through 'Panch Sheel' almost failed till mid-sixties due to the lack of appropriate military preparedness. 'However, a pacific policy may be, there must be power of some kind to defend it',¹³.

But, at the sametime it will be wrong to say that military power is the be-all and end-all in the success of foreign policy, for, it is one thing to speak from a position of power than to plead from a position of weakness. 'Troops are' of course, 'an important determinant of a successful foreign policy but without other foundations they will not suffice',¹⁴. The actual test of military power is in the preparedness to meet an eventuality.

HUMAN FACTOR

Population is an essential element of national power. This may be an asset as well as a liability to the foreign policy of a state. It is a quantitative factor that obviously must be considered in every calculation of the capacity of states¹⁶. But in the context of foreign policy the population should be examined in both the terms - quantitative and qualitative. Although a considerable number is necessarily required, yet the quality of the people is equally important. Qualitative number in total population may be called the real manpower. It is the qualitative manpower that will convert the national power potential into actual power potential. Again it is such manpower that is more likely to give a nation a better cohesive and harmonious society. States with large multi-racial, multi-religious and different social systems tend to create friction and antagonism leading to internal insecurity. It is the qualitative manpower and leadership that can unite such diversity into one national unit.

However, the qualitative manpower is also a comparative term. It can only be assessed in comparison with other state's manpower in terms of their productive, psychological and leadership elements. A country with small qualitative manpower is superior to a country with large

quantitative manpower. A quantitative manpower can only be a burden on a nation's resources, whereas a qualitative manpower builds up and enhances its resources.

POLITICAL FACTORS

Among the political factors ideology comes first to be discussed in relation to foreign policy. The term ideology applies not only to the manner in which objectives are shaped, but also to how the given objectives will be pursued¹⁵. It forms one compact whole of several parts and particulars bound with one another and going together¹⁶. It, however, directly influences the making of foreign policy. The ideology of non-alignment has become a predominant factor in India's external affairs. United States universal democracy highlights an anti-communist course of action throughout the world, whereas the communist ideology of Soviet Union represents a tendency of barring the US imperialist expansionism.

The next political factor is national interest. This may be explained in terms of highest good of the people. National interest is the embodiment of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political stability, economic solidarity, techno-scientific advancement and cultural propriety of a state.

In Morgenthau's view the minimum requirement of nation states is to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states¹⁷. National interest is, therefore, an ultimate end of foreign policy. In the community of states the foreign policy operates as a positive media for securing national interests. The interests are supreme and dictate the foreign policy. Obviously, in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs¹⁸.

Public opinion is another political factor which partly affects the foreign policy of a state. There are a number of institutions in a state which represent the public opinion, e.g., opposition parties, pressure groups, press, academic centres, foreign policy experts and public organisations. It is commonly believed that in independent countries the public opinion exerts considerable influence over the foreign policy, but it is not as such in the real practice. In 1950 when Peoples Republic of China claimed her suzerainty over Tibet, the common public opinion in India was in favour of at least a diplomatic opposition to China, but the government plainly bye-passed it and accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. However, more or less, the public opinion has its role in determining the foreign

policy in democratic states where the Press avails its freedom. In authoritarian and one-party ruled states the public opinion does not carry any weight in the matters of foreign policy. Yet, for deciding a successful policy, public opinion, the position of political parties, and the demands of major pressure groups must be discovered and considered¹⁹.

A free Press, too, influences the conduct of foreign policy, but only exceptionally. The public opinion in a state is rightly expressed through an uncensored Press but it is not essentially to be respected by the government and give a place in foreign affairs. This also depends upon the working-method of the head of the state, because even in democratic states the chief-executive chooses to work, despotically. It is in the United States where the Press enjoys complete freedom and influences the foreign policy planning. History of freedom of Press in England dates back to 1638 and since then the Press has been an important aspect in conducting the foreign affairs in that country.

GLOBAL-POLITICAL FACTOR

The global political environment is a most compelling factor in the shaping of a state's foreign policy, Establishing a viable trend in foreign relations

depends upon the analysis of the trend of behaviour adopted by various categories of nations - the super powers, the big powers, the regional powers and other independent nations including immediate neighbours. There are varieties of situations by which policy makers may be confronted-an armed attack, an economic crisis or a diplomatic overture, for instance each calls for a distinctive response²⁰. Emergence of supra-national actors bipolarized the global politics in the post-Second World War period and encouraged the trend of cold war which ultimately resulted in the growth of alliance-system. Most of the nations according to their geography, ideology and interest aligned themselves with one super power or the other and the rest, for the sake of preserving their independence, preferred the path of non-alignment. India, being fed up of about two centuries foreign subordination, chose to keep away of the power-politics of the super powers through a non-aligned approach.

CONSTITUTIONAL FACTOR

The constitutional factor refers to the governmental system of a state which has a direct bearing upon the foreign policy formulation. In the democratic states the making of foreign policy is not the business

of single person or a group of persons, but it remains open for discussion and endorsement of popular and genuine views of various agencies, e.g., opposition parties, pressure groups, political elites, Press, general public opinion, academic erudities as well as institutions. Generally the democratic governments do not ignore the cluster of views related to foreign affairs. But it should not be taken for granted. In the United States the general and debated matters of foreign policy are required to be testified before the Secretary of State on the direction of Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives²¹. In England Parliamentary debates are held on foreign policy moves. The question system in the Parliament also helps in curbing the actions of the Executive. The most healthy practice in England is that Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary consults the opposition leaders on foreign policy issues²².

But in the states with one-party system as in communist countries, the foreign policy decisions remain confined to the Politbureau. It does not invite discussions or comments on foreign affairs, from any public agency. Preservation and expansion of ideology is the underlying theme in such countries.

The same pattern is followed in the authoritarian states. Foreign policy remains the monopoly of the military

administrator who constitutes the foreign policy with the sole object of strengthening his political position in the state. Normally, personal interests of the ruler supersede those of the state. Military regimes of Gen. Zia-ul Haq and Lt. Gen. Ershad respectively in Pakistan and Bangla Desh are good illustrations of the same.

MORAL FACTOR

The character of the people works as a moral force to the foreign policy of a state. It gives an additional strength in the implementation of policy. The national character, as it is generally called, is combination of several qualities of the people, e.g., hard-working capacity, patience, honesty, perseverance, patriotism, pride for glorious traditions and national honour. This was the national character which inspired Germany, after a greater humiliation in World War First to discard the policy of appeasement and regain the lost glory by opting for war against the Allies. It is a history in itself that India emancipated herself from two centuries of colonial grip through a non-violent and peaceful struggle. Again, as a free nation, she adhered to the policy of non-alignment for the purpose of maintaining world peace and security. Moral force is, undoubtedly, a pivotal element behind this unique tradition.

PURPOSE

Aims of foreign policy are often discussed in different terms as 'purposes', 'objects' or 'objectives'. Not only this, sometimes it is confused with 'interests'. But in the proper analysis it is found that 'purpose' is the key point and the total process of foreign policy-making centers around it. At first, a state undertakes the purpose and then shapes the foreign policy. The purpose may be replaced with the term 'aim' since both terms carry the same meaning.

The aims may also be classified into two groups - primary aims and secondary aims. The primary aims, being static in nature, play a key role in shaping the foreign policy. The attempt to regulate the conflicting needs and demands of large numbers of people in order to perpetuate a relatively just and harmonious society could be considered the primary aim of politics²³. Territorial integrity, political independence, economic self-sufficiency, technological advancement and cultural propriety are the primary aims of foreign policy. Michael B. Dolan, Brian W. Tomlin, H.V. Rickhoff and M.A. Holot assume that most, if not all, governments conduct foreign policy in pursuit of the pre-eminent long range goals of economic well-being and political autonomy²⁴.

So far the 'aim' has been taken as the synonym of 'interest', it is somewhat an illusive interpretation. The interests are always changing and they help in achieving the aims of the policy and thus play a secondary role. The secondary aims are the result of political and strategic situations which arise from time to time and adversely affect the continuing interests of a state. In order to secure and maintain those continuing interests it becomes necessary to achieve the secondary aims through foreign policy. In the political process the aim occurs as a casual feature whereas the interests work as a permanent factor therein.

The big power rivalry in the Indian Ocean which started in early seventies affects the security and economic interests of India and, therefore, the secondary aim before her is to make Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace free from big power rivalry.

Prof. Morgenthau, one of the prominent realists of twentieth century, confines the aims of foreign policy merely to the realms of power. In his analysis, a political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power or to demonstrate power²⁵. This may better be interpreted as the aims to maintain status-quo, to continue imperialism and to secure prestige.

IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES

The execution of foreign policy is difficult than its formulation. Normally there are two techniques - first peaceful technique and the second violent or coercive technique. The diplomacy is the most popular and peaceful technique to implement the foreign policy successfully. While defining diplomacy the scholars have accepted it as a means to execute foreign policy. J.R. Childs observes diplomacy as the process by which foreign policy is carried out²⁶. Further, this has been held as one of the significant means of the execution of foreign policy goal²⁷. Hence, as a means of foreign policy, diplomacy seeks to adjust national with international interests²⁸.

Diplomacy in a popular sense means the employment of tact, shrewdness and skill in any negotiation or transaction²⁹. Certainly, the diplomacy has been recognised in vehemance as a means to carry out foreign policy. And as a means, it includes several specific methods such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement. Through negotiation it may be possible to achieve the desired goal but through arbitration, mediation or judicial settlement a state may lose the foreign policy

objectives since in these methods will of the third party prevails. But, through negotiations the desired objectives may be achieved to the maximum satisfaction because the negotiations are held mostly through bilateral talks and in this process both the parties, involved in the issue, try their best to obtain the maximum on the negotiating table according to their policy planning. The Simla Agreement of June 1972 was a satisfactory negotiation for India vis-a-vis Pakistan because of being agreed upon independently on a bilateral basis. But the Tashkent Agreement of January 1966, due to have been supervised by Soviet Union, could not bring positive results.

The Ping-Pong diplomacy has been a successful step taken by United States in the early 1970s in pursuance of her policy in South East Asia to win over China on her part vis-a-vis Soviet Union. This was an unique development in the global order, for, it established detente between two decades on the ideological point. Display of force and threat of war are also among the instruments of diplomacy, but if war itself begins diplomacy is usually interrupted between the belligerents⁵⁰.

The violent or coercive technique to implement the foreign policy is war. A state resorts to this method at last when ultimately all the diplomatic measures fail to secure

foreign policy objectives. The military power still remains an indispensable instrument..... Every act of a state is directed towards war, though as an undesirable weapon but all the same as a weapon of the last resort³¹. R.W.Benjamin and L.J. Edinger view that potential or actual use of force against other states is a key element in the conduct of foreign relation³². 'The military establishments of nations comprise the most explicit element of foreign policy'³³.

This analysis establishes the fact that the main driving force behind the global politics is military power. This has two ways of working - indirectly and directly. In the first instance, in relation to the continuation of foreign policy it works indirectly by giving weight to planning and thereby helps in materializing the immediate objective on the negotiating table in the face of the opposite party. In the second place the military power directly works for the continuation of foreign policy in order to attain the objective. This direct working implies the state of war. When attainment of the objective becomes impossible due to the failure of peaceful diplomatic means, it is the military power which works directly in steering the foreign policy and bringing it into process. This method is resorted to in the absolute interest of the nation. This interpretation justifies the suitability of Clausewitzian theory that war is nothing else than the continuation of

state policy through different means³⁴. Diplomacy and military strength, therefore, go hand in hand³⁵. In this sense diplomacy should be held as a broader phenomenon, against the prevalent tendency, which imbibes in itself both the means-peaceful and coercive.

CO-RELATIONAL RELATIONSHIP

Security is the pre-requisite for a nation's existence. Basically the security presents a state in which a nation enjoys a sense of safety towards its territorial integrity and sovereignty. All countries, big and small, desire and continuously search for national security. Security implies, at the minimum level, independence and territorial integrity³⁶. In other words security means some sort of protection of values which have been previously acquired³⁷.

This an absolute function of foreign policy to condition the state of security since it is necessarily related with other nations. An overall security system of a nation is based on two essential factors; first, a good setting of foreign relations and second, a good economic structure to forge the military power. However, both these factors are the outcomes of a good foreign policy.

Obviously, national security interests and organisations thus predominate in the foreign policy activities of any large nation³⁸.

The post-war era started with the struggle for power. The formulation of foreign policy during this period specifically aimed at corresponding a sound defence policy to provide a state with an intensified defence structure. Independent existence of a state is dependent upon the footings of security and which, in any case, cannot eschew itself from the foreign policy. The defence and foreign policies of any nation are directly co-related: the adequacy of country's military strength enables it to pursue other objectives of foreign policy just as foreign policy is expected to supplement defence efforts³⁹.

Apparently a good foreign policy may be adjudged in view of the purposes it serves for a state during its operation. Firstly, it seeks an adjustment which is required for a state in the international setting by offering opportunities of an independent existence, coherent with the national ideology. Secondly, it strengthens the security measures to the extent it seems necessary for securing vital interests essential for the survival of a state. Thirdly, it promotes the commercial and industrial interests of a state

in order to provide it with a good economic structure which is today a pre-condition for an independent existence. Fourthly, it secures the territorial integrity and political independence and finally it helps to preserve the national traditions and cultural norms of the people which correspond to the national honour and prestige.

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CHAPTER - THREE

NON-ALIGNMENT AS INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The trend of international relations took a metamorphic turn after the closing of World War Two in 1945. Emergence of two Super Powers bi-polarized the international system which resulted in the struggle for power. Both the Super Powers started strengthening their blocs by enrolling more and more states through psycho-political as well as economic methods. This process naturally jeopardized the existence of newly liberated peace loving nations which were persistently aspiring for an independent identity of their own on the world stage.

Under these circumstances the concept of non-alignment appeared as an alternative and India has the credit of being the first nation to adopt this concept as a guiding theme of her foreign policy. This was not totally a new concept for India, because AICC (All India Congress Committee) resolution of 1921 had given a clear cut direction for the foreign policy practice. The AICC session at Madras in 1927 and Calcutta in 1928 paved the way for 'non-alignment'. After the formation of Interim or Provisional Government Jawahar Lal Nehru expressed clearly the shape of foreign policy in his broadcast of September 7, 1946 from New Delhi,

'we shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely a satellite of another nation'¹. He further added, 'we propose as far as possible, to keep away from power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past two world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale'².

After independence the formulation of India's foreign policy was conditioned by economic needs as well as international circumstances. At this point of time India was compelled to choose an 'in between line' so as to receive economic assistance from both the camps-non-communist and Communist for the sake of her economic restructure which was the gross need of the time for structuring a socialistic pattern of democracy. On December 13, 1946 in the Constituent Assembly Nehru said, 'We stand for democracy..... the fullest democracy I hope'³. Through democracy Nehru meant the 'economic democracy' which was the Fundamental characteristic of a socialist state. He made it clear in his address, '.... India will stand for socialism and that India will go towards the constitution of a Socialist State....'⁴. The socialistic pattern was an independent socio-economic system politically based on the democratic principles. Moreover, it had no leaning towards either of the power groupings and being free from

any pressure it suited to the conditions and backgrounds of India. Thus, virtually the economic requirements compelled Nehru to start the foreign policy planning on the non-aligned lines.

Similarly the international circumstances too are responsible for shaping India's foreign policy. India's foreign policy architect Prime Minister Nehru evolved a friendly policy based on the principle - 'friendship with all and hostility with none'. On December 13, 1947 in the Constituent Assembly, he said, 'We approach the world in a friendly way. We want to make friends with all countries. We want to make friends, inspite of the long history of conflict in the past, with England also⁵.

Nehru conceived it better in the broader interest of the nation to follow a non-aligned policy to operate India's relations in the international system broadly dominated by two power-groups hostile to one another. This was a period when cold war was in its extreme process. No power-bloc appreciated India's independent stand and suspected her leaning towards the rival group. Nehru made it obvious that what would be the trend of India's relations with other countries of the world. He said, 'India in so far as it has a foreign policy, has declared that it wants to remain

independent and free of all these blocs and that it wants to co-operate on equal terms with all countries'⁶.

Nehru was a protagonist of global co-operation, security and peace. His foreign policy planning had two objects. One was global while the other was national. Although he is often criticised for his global object as being idealistic but in the true sense it was not at all idealistic. It was absolutely realistic in terms of national interest because by creating an international order of peace and cooperation Nehru wanted to establish India's relations with other nations on the basis of equality, fraternity and goodwill. 'We wish for peace', he said. 'We don't want to fight any nation if we can help it. The only possible real objective that we, in common with other nations, can have is the objective of cooperating in building up some kind of world structure, call it One world, call it what you like'⁷. The national objective of Nehru's policy was aimed at the economic reconstruction of colonially torn India. He aimed at the economic reconstruction and overall re-building of the nation on regional as well as global level and to establish India's friendly relations with all. Thus, in the broader purview of national interests he first of all envisaged to create a peaceful global order and secondly to operate India's relations in that global order on the lines of non-alignment.

Nehru made it clear that 'ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and until India has evolved her economic policy her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather incoherent, and will be grouping'⁸.

In the post war period the survival and progress of the newly independent states was subject to world peace, freedom and cooperation. These factors needed a new international system free of aggressive designs, mutual tensions and power-groupings. Prime Minister Nehru said 'It is well for us to say that we stand for peace and freedom and..... we do stand for peace and freedom'⁹. India took lead as the first nation to adhere to the policy of non-alignment in order to form a new world structure of peace, cooperation and goodwill. 'The presence of India among the non-aligned is for that reason heavily weighted in favour of non-alignment. Nehru could not help thinking big and he saw India's interests as being best served in a world at peace, with independent countries helping one another'¹⁰. The concept of non-alignment did have a broader meaning. While on one hand it proposed to avoid alliance with power blocs or entangling in any power grouping, it upheld the need for closer friendly relations with other countries on the other. On March 8, 1949 Prime Minister Nehru made it

clear by saying that 'We have stated repeatedly that our foreign policy is one of keeping aloof from the big blocs of nations-rival blocs - and being friendly to all countries and not becoming entangled in any alliance, military or other, that might drag us into any possible conflict. That does not, on the other hand, involve any lack of close relationships with other countries'¹¹.

The post-war decolonialization took place in Asia and Africa. These newly liberated countries were left economically exploited by their previous rulers. Hence, for the sake of the common cause of protecting their freedom and cultivating their economic progress it seemed essential to bring them in closer social, cultural and economic relations.

This was naturally to give impetus to Nehru's comprehensively perceived aims of non-alignment to attain peace and cooperation and it was visualized essential for attaining and maximizing the national interests of India. With this very object to unite together the countries of Asia. Even before independence Prime Minister Nehru took up the initiative of arousing the consciousness among the nations of Asia. The Asian Relations Conference was convened at New Delhi in March 1947. Really this was a first regional get-to-gather of Asians which aroused the cooperative consciousness among the members and strengthened

their belief in the concept of non-alignment as an instrument or a means of foreign policy. Not only this, the conference proved to be a diplomatic gain to elevate the image of India as a 'would be major role player' in Asia which was at the verge of obtaining freedom. While inaugurating the Asian Relations Conference on March 23, 1947 Nehru said, 'There was a wide-spread urge and an awareness that the time had come for us, people of Asia, to meet together, to hold to-gather and to advance to-gather. It was not only a vague desire, but the compulsion of events that forced all of us to think along these lines'¹².

Nehru had well realized the prospects of India's leading role in the world affairs. The geography has gifted her such a strategic location that she is naturally assigned with major roles to play in the region as well as in the international system as a whole. The Asian Conference was a first step taken by India towards this major role. In the Conference Nehru accepted India's major assignment in Asia. He said 'All countries of Asia have to meet to-gather on all equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development'¹³. The foremost purpose of convening Asian Relations Conference

was to discuss conditions of peace in Asia and in the world. This was only possible through Asian consciousness which was subject to the wide recognition to non-alignment as a foreign policy ideology. The non-alignment in real practice could materialize the concept of 'Asianism' or 'Asian-consciousness' or 'Asian solidarity'. Nehru emphasizing over the role of Asia said, 'In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part.....the whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful, and the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace'¹⁴.

In his scheme of international politics Nehru, by creating the conditions of peace and cooperation, proposed to form a new global structure free of power struggle and mutual tension. He called it a 'New Structure' or 'One World'. For this purpose too he realized the need of Asian Cooperation. He expressed 'We have arrived at a stage in human affairs when the ideal of One world and some kind of a World, Federation seem to be essential..... But in order to have One World we must also, in Asia, think of the countries of Asia co-operating to-gather for that larger ideal'¹⁵.

In the process of cultivating Asian cooperation Nehru realized the difficulty regarding Chinese claim over Tibet. For making Asia an 'area of peace' and 'mutual cooperation' the equal support from China was an essential condition. Hence, he took up the task smoothly by accepting Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and thus resolving the issue pacifically. On December 6, 1950 Nehru said, 'we had no territorial or political ambitions in regard to Tibet and that our relations were cultural and commercial....He further said that we were anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy it has held for at least the last forty years. We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet'¹⁶.

The issue of Tibet, as Nehru deemed may be the cause of unrest between India and China, was permanently settled through the Agreement of Panchsheel in May 1954. Regarding Panchsheel Nehru spoke in Lok Sabha on May 18, 1954 'an event-and a very important event-that I would like to draw the attention of the House to, is the agreement between India and China in regard to Tibet. That agreement deals with a large number of problems.....'¹⁷. Five principles were laid down in the preamble to the agreement which became the guiding factor for India's foreign policy. The preamble¹⁸ reads as follows:-

- (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (ii) Mutual non-aggression;
- (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and
- (v) Peaceful co-existence.

The obstacle in Asian peace programme was thus removed by cementing ties with China, the Asian partner, through the agreement of Panchsheel. Prime Minister Nehru underlined in the Lok Sabha that Panchsheel was a 'healthy approach' to the problem of collective security in Asia and it was considered to help in the preservation of global as well as regional peace. He emphasized that the bilateral agreement had wider implication¹⁹.

The historical Panchsheel Agreement gave full expression to India's policy of non-alignment. It was a concrete step towards the realization of peace in Asia and creating an environment conducive to the broader interests of the nation. By accepting Chinese suzerainty

over Tibet and later befriending her Prime Minister Nehru tried to avoid the unnecessary tension over the northern border. Furthermore, the bilateral Agreement of 1954 was sought to curb the perceived Chinese expansionism in Asia. In fact, the agreement presented Nehru's broader peace plans. He himself said, 'By this agreement, we ensure to a very large extent peace in a certain area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that this area of peace could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world'²⁰.

The Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955 also added much to the India's policy of non-alignment. Nehru's vision of 'area of peace' primarily included the colonially exploited nations of Africa along with Asia. He wanted to create an environment of peace which was deemed essential to solve the national problems. This environment was to be created in Asia and Africa as an essential requirement for the fulfilment of the basic interests of the nation. On April 24, 1955, at the concluding session of the Bandung Conference Prime Minister Nehru said 'We all come with our own perspectives, each considering his own problem the most important in the world. At the same time, we are trying to understand the big problems of the world and to fit our problems into

this larger context, because in the ultimate analysis, all our problems, however, important they may be, can not be kept apart from these larger problems'²¹. Creation of an area of peace, according to Nehru, was an essential condition for solving the national problems and therefore, peace was the subject of prime consideration.

Obviously the policy of non-alignment was fashioned to ensure peace around the sub-continent including the regions of Asia and Africa, for, peace was the essential condition for the well being of India as well as other nations free from the colonial clutches.

India was economically shattered during the British rule. The freedom fell upon her with the burden of economic re-construction. This was the common problem with India and all other nations of Asia and Africa. Apart from it the super powers cold war move created again a problem for the independent existence of the newly liberated nations. The policy of non-alignment, therefore, proved to be a commonly recognized approach for peace, security and prosperity. This was the only way out for political freedom and economic upliftment of the Afro-Asian nations. On April 9, 1958 in the Lok Sabha Nehru said, 'We may hold to our principles and to idea of our security, but let us

recognize the fact that we have to live in this world to-gather in peace. We have to find a way of co-existence. The only way is by peaceful methods.....'²².

The choice of India's foreign policy was infact originated by the choice of peace. For Nehru the choice of peace and its attainment was ultimately necessary in the circumstances of post-World War international system. This was not idealistic, as others held it. In the prevailing circumstances it was the quite realistic view of the world affairs. Delivering his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs on March 22, 1949 Nehru said 'While remaining quite apart from power blocs, we are in a far better position to cast our weight at the right moment in favour of peace, and meanwhile our relations can become as close as possible in the economic or other domain with such countries with whom we can easily develop them'²³. He clarified the controversy of idealism and realism regarding his choice of policy. 'Idealism is the realism of tomorrow, he said. 'It is the capacity to know what is good for the day after tomorrow or for the next year and to fashion yourself accordingly'²⁴ he added.

Respect to the charter of United Nations was also one of the basic objects of India's non-alignment.

This aspect of the foreign policy ideology was put to severe test just after independence when Pakistan, India's next door neighbour invaded Kashmir to merge it with her own territory. On January 1, 1948 India, under article 35* of the UN Charter complained about Pakistan creating disturbance in Kashmir State and requested the Security Council to ask Pakistan for preventing the intrusion of Pakistani tribesmen in Kashmir. Pakistan too, put up her grievance before the Security Council and raised the issue against India under Article 35 of the UN Charter.

In July 1948 the UN Commission came over to the Indian Sub-continent and after six months it could negotiate with India and Pakistan and was successful in establishing a cease-fire between them from January 1, 1949. India stuck to the tradition of upholding the respect for the UN Charter in her relations with other countries in the globe. For India the United Nations was the only widely recognized world forum which could effect the peace in the post-world war international system. India through her non-aligned posture

* According to article 35 'Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. According to the article 34 'The Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security'.

supported the world organisation in its attempt to bring international peace and cooperation. Nehru felt that the United Nations represented the 'timeless urge of humanity for peace' and 'it was based on a presumption of universality because it symbolized the longing among all peoples for the return of peace'²⁵.

For the sake of international peace and security India's policy of non-alignment always discouraged the tendency of manufacturing and stocking of nuclear weapons by the super powers. The disastrous nature of the nuclear weapons, which has already been experienced in Japan following the end of World War Two, was to cause insecurity and disturb the prospects of peace. However, the nuclear naves advocated a new approach in the international system of filling the power-vaccums. This caused a serious concern to the countries which appreciated the principle of peaceful co-existence. On March 25, 1957 while speaking on foreign affairs in Lok Sabha Nehru said, 'That, I feel, is a dangerous approach. It is an unreal approach to say that every country which has insufficient armaments is a vacuum'²⁶.

Undoubtedly, this came to the fore that the real danger, which mars the prospects of peace and security

in the post-war era, comes from the nuclear weapons of mass-destruction. India exclusively condemned the tendency of manufacturing, testing and stocking the nuclear armaments. In Rajya Sabha Prime Minister Nehru said on May 24, 1957, 'Everyone agrees about the dangers from the atomic and hydrogen bombs. Everyone agrees that they should be eliminated.....We suggest that the nuclear tests should be suspended and ultimately banned'²⁷. India tried her best to get stopped all sorts of nuclear tests and she favoured an effective and complete disarmament which could end the devastating horror from the minds of the people. Nehru felt that there was a burden on the minds of the people - the burden of horror of destruction. The existence of nuclear weapons has menaced the whole of the human race. He expressed his desire on November 7, 1957, 'I venture, therefore, to make this appeal to the great leaders, more especially of America and Russia.....I appeal to them to stop all nuclear test explosions and thus to show to the world they are determined to end this menace, and to proceed also to bring about effective disarmament'²⁶.

The basic orientation of India's policy of non-alignment beyond peace and security was the liberation of nations put under the domination of colonialism and

imperialism. Support to the nations fighting for their liberation from all sorts of colonial or imperial manifestations was one of the inherent objects of India's foreign policy. While speaking in the UN General Assembly on November 3, 1948 Nehru said, 'Great countries like India who have passed out of that colonial stage do not conceive it possible that other countries should remain under the yoke of colonial rule'²⁹. The first non-aligned summit at Belgrade in September 1961 upheld the issue of liberation of those nations which were being suppressed under the colonial and imperial domination and were, however, making attempts to get rid of the foreign domination. The non-aligned nations discussed at length the issue of colonial domination. 'Their initial concern however was the unfettered emergence of the nationalist liberation forces towards political freedom and sovereignty. This aspect of their external involvement propelled them in the direction of a global struggle what they termed as the forces of the old order, i.e. 'colonialism, imperialism and non-colonialism' in their multiple manifestation'³⁰.

The non-alignment, thus, emerged as an alternative for the newly independent nations in the post-war era which did not opt to ally themselves with either of the power blocs and chose to exist as free nations without any sort of

foreign string. Since they had suffered a lot remaining under the foreign domination, they preferred to have an independent existence without being play in the hands of powerful nations of the world. India was the first among such nations which adopted the theory of non-alignment to continue her intaction with other nations in the post-war international system. In the case of India this fact cannot be denied that the theory of non-alignment has its root in the long back tradition of peace and non-violence practised by Lord Buddha and Emperor Ashoka. India's struggle for freedom too paved the way for the non-aligned policy. The independence movement was seen as a non-violent and peaceful struggle won through satyagrah under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. Certainly, India's tradition of peace played an important role in the formulation of her foreign policy.

The end of the Second World War, with the dropping of nuclear bomb over Japan, established the superiority of United State in the globe. The power-superiority was later shared by the USSR by the end of the forties. This was, however, the cause of the genesis of cold war as a new theory in the global politics. The theory of non-alignment was, therefore, the only political strategy to counter the cold war moves for the sake of surviving as independent nations in the globe.

India adopted her external policy of non-alignment both in theory and practice with the sole object of surviving as a free nation in the global system. The non-alignment was neither a moral principle and not a legal position as interpreted in the terms of international law. Neither it was a philosophical advocacy of Nehru's idealism as it is sometimes misunderstood. Against its misinterpretation it was not at all the position of positive neutrality. Ultimately it was the reality of international politics and appropriate demand of the time which was conceded by Nehru as a correct political strategy to be adopted for the overall good of the nation. The policy of non-alignment, thus, provided India with the freedom to analyze the world affairs in her own way in the capacity of an independent nation and express her views according to own judgement. The theory and practice of non-alignment was followed in a stable way to design the destiny of India as a big Asian nation to strengthen the prospects of peace and cooperation throughout the world. This was not taken into operation as a temporary policy followed on the trial and error basis. In the arena of cold war India's initiative to non-alignment worked as an effective force in the relaxation of the global tension.

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However, India pioneered the cause of international peace and security through the non-aligned approach to the issues endangering the peace on regional or global basis. The problems of Korea, Vietnam and Arab-Israel were approached with the object of bringing an amicable settlement and lessening the tension which might have jeopardized the world peace. India earnestly tried to resolve the bilateral issues with China and Pakistan in a pacific manner for the purpose of maintaining the regional peace and cooperation. In her attempt she upheld the role of United Nations as the highest organisation of world peace.

Non-alignment, in due course, was followed as an external policy by most of the Afro-Asian nations. Cuba was the only Latin American country which entered into the non-aligned group since the beginning. The Arab countries due to their oil wealth acquired an unique strategic importance for both the power blocs. And this was the cause of attraction for both of the super powers. But this attraction was certainly to result in a ruinous confrontation between them. Further, the Arab world was interested to maintain the Islamic identity alongwith the solidarity of Muslim countries. So, for avoiding super power interference and to come in line with various ways of modernization the Arab States sought to choose non-alignment as their external

policy. Thus the non-aligned forum included Asians, Africans, the Arab States and Latin America. Similarly the concept was strengthened by other world leaders besides Nehru. President Tito of Yugoslavia has the credit of giving non-alignment a shape of world movement. 'He had taken the initiative to forge a movement out of a collection of diverse countries because he spotted their common desire to seek the sanctuary of a group in a world that was increasingly subjected to the pressures of the cold war'³¹.

Nasser, too, is one of the founders of non-alignment. His main instrument for fighting against the western imperialism was the Arab-nationalism. 'And non-alignment provided the right ideological cover for accepting military or economic aid from either bloc when there was in fact no alternative'³². Thus, not only for India but for other followers too, non-aligned policy proved to be a realistic approach for the purpose of materialising the national interests in the post-war global politics hit by cold war. But, 'India's devotion to world peace right from the beginning had strong overtones of national self-interests, though humanitarian motives and concern for other nations were never absent'³³. The basic concern of non-alignment, which cannot be denied, has been to create the conditions of peace from the regional to global level, because peace has been the paramount

requirement for security and multi-dimensional development of India as well as other independent nations. Non-alignment was the only feasible approach to world politics to establish friendly relations with both the power blocs which could help the nations to seek economic assistance equally from either of the blocs without yielding to their pressures. This concept in the foreign policy practice worked as a means to achieve the ultimate interests of the nations. The underlying reason behind the mis-conception of the concept has been that the non-alignment was confused with the end of the policy. The 'ultimate goal of our foreign policy, like that of any other country, is to promote our enlightened national interests, and non-alignment was only a means to that end.....The concept of non-alignment is a positive and dynamic concept intended to serve tangible national interests.....'³⁴.

The concept of non-alignment, therefore, as a best possible alternative for India's policy appropriately suited to the international circumstances under which Nehru accepted it as the nation's external policy. The non-alignment helped India in securing her territorial integrity and sovereignty and in proceeding ahead on the path of economic and industrial progress. Keeping away from military alignment with any of the power groupings she successfully avoided her involvement in international disputes. She only

expressed her views independently judging any issue on the basis of its merit. India worked for regional peace and stability as well as for global cooperation and peace. Nehru had perceived it even earlier to the freedom that survival and progress of free India could be possible in an arena of peace and cooperation and therefore in the foreign policy practice of India he preferred non-alignment as a means to that pre-conceived end.

Non-alignment, not as a doctrinaire, but as a positive approach helped India in seeking and fulfilling her national interests. She pursued it dynamically in response to a situation whenever the vital national interest was at stake. For instance India immediately sought US help for warding off the danger on her northern and north-eastern border when People's China made aggression in October, 1962. 'Politically, China failed to dislodge India from the non-aligned position, since the latter entered into no military pact nor made any political or military commitments to any power bloc'³⁵.

A greater reshuffling took place in the global power equation with the establishment of Sino-US detente in the beginning of the eighties. This equation adversely affected India's security interests when it started supporting Pakistan vis-a-vis India on the issue of Bangla Desh liberation (erstwhile East Pakistan). India, within the structure of non-alignment, entered into twenty years

treaty of 'Peace Friendship and Cooperation' with USSR to counter the ill designs of Sino-US-Pak Triangle.

Again her non-aligned posture was put to test when in December 1979 Soviet Union posted her troops in Afganistan. India, despite her closer links with the Soviet Union, expressed her independent views and demanded the withdrawl of foreign troops from Afganistan, for, on the one hand the pressure of Soviet troops in Afganistan was against the non-aligned principles and on the other it was to cause instability in the Indian sub-continent and in the South Asian region. Therefore, India's non-aligned stand in every regional or global situation was in pursuit of peace and national interests.

Similarly, regarding the nuclear issues, India, within the framework of non-alignment, declared to adhere to the policy of peaceful use of atomic energy for the sake of strengthening the global peace and security. But at the same time she kept her nuclear option open in the basic interest of the national security by not signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. India declined to sign the NPT because it aimed at retaining the monopoly of nuclear haves and putting a bar over the nuclear development of the nations which have a scope to play a significant role atleast in the regional politics of the globe.

Thus, the non-alignment as India's foreign policy strategy since independence worked as a positive means

to serve the interests of the nation. Considering non-alignment in the strict security terms it is apparent that this policy, as a dynamic means, helped to achieve the objectives whenever the security of the nation was at stake.

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CHAPTER - FOUR

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 1960 - 70 : A SECURITY-BACK GROUND

After a prolonged liberation movement India could free herself from the colonial domination of Britain. Since, peace and non-violence had been the pivot of her 'Satyagrah' movement, her foreign policy, too, after independence, endorsed in itself these pivotal factors to operate in the post-war international system with the ultimate object of global security and peace. It is a natural phenomenon that every nation formulates its foreign policy for fulfilling the national interests, so is the case with India also. The architect of India's foreign policy Jawaharlal Nehru structured it keeping in view the immediate and long term national interests of the country. There is one school of thought which is very much critical to the Nehru's policy on the ground that it was an idealistic policy having an universal outlook which realistically neglected the wants and needs of the country particularly in the terms of national defence and security. But Nehru's ultimate object was 'peace' which indirectly in broader terms meant security. Because, 'Security was free India's paramount need. Militarily weak India could not be at logger-heads with any powerful country'¹.

Therefore, 'Nehru's concept of non-alignment had an implicit security rationale'². He said 'After all, peace is a quality; it is a way of approach, it is a way of doing things; it is an objective we want to reach'³. In his calculations if a long term condition of peace was not to be available he wanted a limited tenure of peace. He expressed his ultimate desire, 'We do not want war anywhere. We want only fifteen years of peace in order to be able to develop our resources'⁴. Nehru contemplated security in the horizons of peace in the overall interest of the nation which was only possible through adhering to non-alignment in theory and in practice. Thus, it was the security compulsion which forced free India to choose non-alignment as a guiding theme to shape her foreign policy.

The concept of non-alignment was the combination of past historical experiences, Indian tradition, prevailing world circumstances and a future image of the world in view of the looming danger to the human survival. Nehru said 'The objectives of our foreign policy are the preservation of world peace and enlargement of human freedom'⁵. Peace should not be judged absolutely in the universal concern. Peace was basically a concern for India-rather a condition for the security of sovereignty, independence and economic well-being.

Nehru's vision of peace was not narrow. He did not perceive it only in the sub-continental or regional context. His perception of peace was 'universal' which was essential to develop global co-operation towards the object of progress and through global cooperation and peace he wanted to serve the interests of his country. On December 4, 1947 in the constituent Assembly speech he said, '.....we propose to look after India's interest in the context of world cooperation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved'⁶.

So far as the security oriented analysis of India's foreign policy in the decade of sixties is concerned, it needs to be systematically classified in two contexts the global and the neighbouring.

THE GLOBAL IMPACT.

If security compulsions relating to the foreign policy are analysed in the global context during sixties, it is necessary to link this decade with the fifties because a remarkable change in the global pattern regarding the sub-continent started around mid-fifties. After independence, India, so as to avoid the cold war moves, followed the policy of equidistance with both the super-powers. 'Equidistance can be practised when relations

with both super-powers are uniformly and equally good or bad. Before 1952, the relations were equally bad and equidistance was strictly practised'⁷.

THE UNITED STATES

This was a period when India's non-aligned stand was suspected as well as criticized by both the super power - the United States and the Soviet Union. While John Foster Dulles viewed India's non-alignment as 'immoral' because India was not aligning herself with the West for the containment of communism, the Soviet Union treated India as 'Imperialist' agent. For Stalin, Nehru was 'a lackey of British imperialism'. 'However, special relations with one super power could not be ruled out'⁸ and that was USA. 'Since concrete national interest did not constitute the basis of a dialogue between India and the USA, Indo-American relations often boiled down to participation by both sides in the global ideological disputations of the post Second World War period'⁹. Yet, efforts were made to continue relations with Britain and seek friendly terms with the United States. 'All the diplomatic moves made by Prime Minister Nehru who was also foreign minister were calculated to attain this main objective'¹⁰. Nehru visited United States for the first time in 1949. There were reciprocal needs on both

the sides. While India needed massive support for her economic reconstruction in the post-independence era, America needed a strong base in South Asia to launch her crusade against communism. Despite the fact that India had declared non-alignment as the only basis of her foreign relations, it was perhaps the illusioned hope of the United States that she expected in India a staunch western-supporter to fight the Soviet communism. This was the basic root of Indo-US relations in the early days of independence. In comparison to Soviet Union India's relations with United States retained a normalcy because of the American moderate attitude towards non-alignment despite several differences due to ideological stand points.

Since security is the paramount interest of any nation, it was but natural that US decision to give arms aid to Pakistan in 1950 created an inhibition in Indian belief regarding the US intention in the sub-continent. Anyway India, due to her tradition of tolerance, tried to overlook the matter and maintain her relationship with America upto 1954 but she could not reconcile with the American view point when Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement * was signed between Pakistan and the USA on September 19, 1954.

*See Appendix I.

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The important aspect which is to be pointed out in the interest which inspired the United States to consider over the arms aid to Pakistan. In this connection impact of the advocacy of Olaf Caroe¹¹ is quite relevant. Olaf Caroe, advocated that Muslim Pakistan traditionally ruled by pro-Britishers would prove quite advantageous for protecting western vital oil interests in the west Asia in comparison to secular India opting for non-alignment. Olaf Caroe's emphasis on Pakistan's strategic importance convinced the US administration that Pakistan would prove to be a more appropriate base in South Asia to protect the oil interests in West Asia as well as to enhance the sphere of influence in the South Asian region against the growing menace of communism. United States, appreciating Pakistan as a suitable base to fight the communist expansion, decided to supply arms to Pakistan through the agreement of 1954. 'Inevitably, the US policy in South Asia became one of offering military aid and other inducements to Pakistan.....to further US policies of encircling the Soviet Union with military and intelligence bases'¹². There is one factor more which is responsible for diverting the US attention from India to Pakistan. India almost at every step contradicted the US policy. For example 'in the fifties Washington assumed that the communist movement was a monolith with its Headquarter in Moscow that China was

Soviet Satellite (Mr. Dean Rusk called it a Slavic Manchukuo on a bigger scale),¹³ but Nehru contradicted these assumptions, in so far as they were related to Asia, that China was not a Soviet Satellite and that Chinese revolution was a part of nationalist resurgence in Asia. 'Indo-American relations in the past have been soured by differences of outlook, assessment and policy on a whole range of international issues and developments',¹⁴ Till early 1954, it became quite clear to United States that India would not join her hands in the crusade against communism and follow the non-alignment strictly. India, however, declined to cooperate with US security arrangement in Asia. She made efforts to establish good friendly relations with the Peoples China, for, 'Nehru's ambition was Indo-Chinese collaboration through which he hoped to achieve the goal of an independent and influential Asia',¹⁵ Thus, US illusion about India aligning with Western bloc was shunned away. This strategic disappointment from India was also one of the basic reasons to instill United States to be interested in Pakistan.

So far Pakistan is concerned 'during first phase of her foreign relations, in the years 1947-52 when she tried to maintain non-involvement in the East-West cold war, Pakistan felt isolated friendless. This increased her sense of insecurity, and she felt the need of the support

of some bigger power'¹⁶. Pakistan's perception of fear was two-sided. In the north she was afraid of Russian Communist hegemony and in the South she felt persistent threat from stronger India. This was the factor basically responsible for shift in Pakistan's foreign policy. In 1953 Pakistan opted for western alliance in the place of non-alignment. 'The quest for security, the search for friends and allies, and the anxiety to maintain territorial integrity, led Pakistan to pursue a policy of alliance with the West, particularly with the United States'¹⁷.

The US-Pak collusion which became open in the form of Mutual Security Agreement in 1954 and Pakistan's alliance with SEATO in 1954 and with CENTO (The Baghdad Pact) in 1955. 'Nehru clearly saw through the likely effects of the infection of cold war tensions into the sub-continental politics'¹⁸. Moreover the arms aid to Pakistan posed a direct threat to Indian security. Around mid-fifties, this was the major security compulsion which pressed Indian leadership to make a shift, in the foreign policy moves, from the American relationship to the pro-communist venture.

THE PEOPLE'S CHINA

As it has been established that due to the trend of US policy in Asia, India had to go in for the pre-

communist venture, but there is one relevant aspect that Nehru had started already working on that pattern as early as 1950. Apart from it there was one reason more which justified the India's security needs at that time. The communization of China and China claiming her suzerainty over Tibet brought the threat of communist expansionism to the door-step of India. And not only this, China's solidification with the Soviet Union as 'communist brothers' also posed a grave danger to the India's security. This situation left only two alternatives open to India, either she should accept an alliance with the West or she should wean away atleast one of the communist giants on her side. As a declared non-aligned nation India could not accept the alliance for her security. She could only go in for the second one, for, it was a diplomatic course and India's foreign policy maker Prime Minister Nehru happily took up this course. 'China, geographically and spiritually nearer to India, naturally, became the first objective of Indian diplomacy..... not withstanding Peking's adverse criticism of India Nehru obstinately maintained that the development of friendly relations between China and India was of vital importance to both the countries'¹⁹. The steps taken to befriend China were, no doubt, in the broader security interests of India. India pleaded for PRC's admission into United Nations, justified the return of

Formosa to Main Land of China, opposed the Japanese Peace Treaty and refused to support the UN resolution which sought to condemn China as an aggressor in Korea. The highest cost, which India had to pay in befriending China, was the recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. When China exercised her occupation over Tibet in 1950, Prime Minister Nehru took no time in accepting the Chinese suzerainty over the borderland. Nehru's step regarding Tibet became a matter of greater controversy and graver criticism. This was the general outlook that Nehru yielded to the Chinese pressure and put the nation's security at stake - that atleast, as a diplomatic step. India should have opposed the move and expressed her discomfiture. But, to utter surprise, what was the limitation which compelled Nehru to accept plainly the Chinese suzerainty over the border land ? which, prior to 1950, had persistently remained an independent country for completely four decades. This was beyond expectation that a greater statesman like Nehru would ignore the vital interests of his country and virtually this was the fact. But by doing so he hoped to ensure his main aim, which was the preservation of the security and integrity of India.²⁰

Since, Nehru realized the serious security compulsion at that moment he tackled the issue of Tibet

peacefully and in order to establish closer friendly relations Nehru initiated to go ahead for the historical Panch Sheel, the bilateral agreement, which was signed between India and China in June 1954. Speaking in Lok Sabha on May 15, 1954 about the importance of Panch Sheel, Prime Minister Nehru said, 'It is a matter of importance to us, of course, as well as I am sure, to China that our two countries, which have now almost about 1,800 miles of frontier, should live in terms of peace and friendliness and..... not commit aggression on each other'²¹. Nehru's idea to Panch Sheel followed the threat perception in different forms. Firstly, '.....Nehru perhaps thought that the best way of managing the Pakistani threat to India's national security in the region would be to pursue friendly 'Panch Sheel' strategy with China. Perhaps he saw in this posture a means by which he could prevent the possibility of China being wooed by Pakistan or vice versa'. Or probably Nehru thought that in the absence of such a foreign policy posture the boundary dispute between India and China could lead to a situation where India will have to take on one more military threat (from China) in addition to the existing one from Pakistan'²². Second, 'Nehru had also realized that any military action by India to defend Tibet in 1950 against China would have been quixotic. India simply did not have the military power to fight against both Pakistan and Communist China in

1950..... Therefore India was incapable of taking 'strong action' in Tibet in 1950....²³ . Third, Nehru over-emphasised the need of world peace and it was the underlying object of his foreign policy. He wanted to attain that object by creating Asia, his own continent, an 'area of peace'. He was quite cautious to maintain Asian solidarity. So it was also a compulsion before him that he should create an environment of peace by befriending China. Fourth, the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China (PRC) both were communist nations and remained 'closest allies'³⁴ between 1949 and 1959. If there was any confrontation with China, it would have naturally annoyed Soviet Union too because at that point of time India's non-alignment was a matter of greater aversion to Russian leadership. So, the situation as a whole put a serious compulsion before India regarding the security interests and it became inevitable to avoid a military confrontation with China.

Prime Minister Nehru himself admitted that prior to 1949, Tibet was recognized as an autonomous state. India's extra-territorial rights in Tibet during the British Period were according to him, 'wrong and unjustified'. It is because of this understanding he recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet. He felt that India, under such a situation, was incapable of undertaking any effective action except to accept the Chinese claim. Justifying his stand in the Lok Sabha he said, 'In these

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circumstances I do submit that the action we took in regard to Tibet was the only logical, legal, constitutional and sensible action that a Government could take'²⁵

The period from 1954 to 1959 has been a course of normal relationship between India and China, though there have been many ups and down in this phase. The bond of cordiality which was undertaken through Panch Sheel and the upheld principles of mutual goodwill started shattering from August 1956 when reports carrying Chinese claims to Bara Hoti and Nilang in Tehri Garhwal came in light. Earlier to this incident, in March 1955 Chinese mischief of inclusion of a part of Indian territory in their map had already been reported. In July 1958, China published a map which included a big chunk of Northern Assam and NEFA as parts of her own territory. China constructed a road in Ak-sai-chin area of Ladakh in 1957. In retrospect, Chinese aggression against India appears to have been part of a plan dating back atleast to 1954. This is evident from the fact that, even though China officially repudiated the traditional and customary boundary between India and China only in 1959, surreptitious Chinese intrusions into Indian territory had started in 1954, becoming more intensive from 1957 onwards²⁶.

In the answer to a question put up by Hom Barua regarding the discussion of McMahon Line with China, Prime Minister Nehru in the Lok Sabha said, 'so far as..... the international frontier is concerned between India and the Chinese State including the Tibetan region, it is not a matter of dispute so far as we are concerned. It is a fixed thing. There is nothing to talk about'²⁷.

The total analysis of the Sino-Indian relations in general and Chinese activities in particular brings about the fact that from 1954 to 1959 China attempted to keep India in dark. She kept her anti-Indian activities continued throughout the period covering them by illusive and principled statements. She wanted to conceal her real intention of territorial expansion and she was in search of an appropriate moment to fulfil it.

On September 8, 1959 Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai wrote a letter in response to P.M. Nehru's letter dated March 22, 1959 in which he referred the boundary issue. He said, 'The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the Five Principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a

well-prepared way step by step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing status-quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, even less by force'²⁸.

The Sino-Indian border dispute, particularly regarding McMahon, is the outcome of British unsettled border policy which took the shape of a complicated issue since mid-fifties. The unsettled status of the boundary became a good pretext for Chinese rulers to encroach the Indian territory to fulfil their expansionist intention. Neville Maxwell's finding about the McMahon Line puts some doubt over the agreement reached in 1914. He holds that 'In the North-East, the McMahon Line had secretly been agreed with the Tibetans; but from the beginning it had been repudiated by China, and was in practice being ignored by Tibet'²⁹. However, India accepted McMahon Line as the genuine border between the two countries on the North Eastern sector for, the Line has been in customary usage since the Simla Conference of March 1914. 'The Line was agreed to by India and Tibet on March 24, 1914, and was marked also on a map attached to the Draft Convention initialled by the plenipotentiaries of India China and Tibet..... The McMahon merely formalised the traditional and customary boundary between India and Tibet'³⁰.

India, on her part, tried best to resolve the differences with People's China regarding the boundary issue which was unnecessarily raised by the latter and under the cloak of that issue she remained involved in the anti-Indian activities since 1956.

Nehru expressed his shock in his letter of September 26, 1959 to Chinese Prime Minister which was also in response to the latter's letter dated September 8, 1959, 'When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years and, I thought, settled'³¹.

The relations between the two countries had been already an abnormal turn till mid 1959. The revolt in Tibet in early 1959 had also fuelled the situation. 'The pronounced Indian sympathy for Tibet and the exceptionally warm welcome extended to the Dalai Lama infuriated the Chinese. On the other hand, a crescendo of an anti-Indian propaganda in China and repeated harassment of Indian traders and nationals in Tibet inflamed Indian public opinion'³².

'The continued Chinese incursions in the absence of a border agreement.....made any progress towards a settlement difficult'³³. In April 1960 Chinese Premier Chou visited India and highlevel talks took place, but they resulted fruitless, and 'the talks predictably ended in a deadlock'³⁴. Actually the Chinese authorities always tried to escape the precision regarding their claims and stands in respect of the boundary issue. They put it in a round-about manner. The reason, apparently, was that their claims lacked basic facts and evidence. On April 26, 1960 while making statements in Lok Sabha regarding the joint 'communique' Prime Minister Nehru said, 'The Chinese, throughout their correspondence or talks, had never given their boundaries precisely, but merely indicated the broad ranges'³⁵.

The ultimate analysis of the Chinese claims and objections regarding the boundary makes it clear that they were not ready to accept the settled boundary between the two countries. The Chinese Foreign Ministry's memorandum which was given to Indian Embassy in China on February 21, 1961 amply evidences this fact. It reads - 'In view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delineated and there is now a dispute between China and India.....the Chinese Government has always hoped to hold friendly consultations with the Indian Government on the basis

of five principles of Peaceful Co-existence and in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, so as to seek a reasonable settlement of the boundary question'³⁶. In reply to this memorandum India's External Affairs Ministry furnished a note to the Chinese Embassy in India on March 30, 1961, 'The Government of India have already furnished to the Government of People's Republic of China precise indication of the traditional boundary. It may further be reaffirmed that while the Government of India remain pledged to the promotion of friendly relations with the Government of the People's of China, they can not accept that the common, traditional boundary is a matter for negotiations, for, as has been stated, the traditional boundary stands defined without the necessity of further or formal delimitation'³⁷.

Further the Chinese Foreign Ministry's note given to Indian Embassy in China on May 4, 1961 established this fact that the Chinese authorities have adopted a very much hardened attitude which is sufficient enough to understand that really they are not interested in resolving the tension and normalising the bilateral relations. Instead, it appeared, that they were avoiding the settlement intentionally and were rather seeking a pretext for a conflict. Excerpt of the note of May 4, 1961 reads -

'However, it must be pointed out that, so long as the Indian Government does not give up its attitude of refusing to negotiate and trying to impose its views on others, the Chinese Government will absolutely not retreat an inch from its stand on the questions of the Sino-Indian boundary and of the tri-junction of China, Burma and India. The Indian Government will never succeed in its unreasonable tangling'³⁸.

On November 28, 1961 in the Lok Sabha 'Nehru admitted candidly that relations between India and China were obviously far from friendly, as was evident from the correspondence, containing charges and counter-charges exchanged between the two Governments.....'China', he said, 'had established three military posts in the course of the last two years, two of which Dambuguru and Nyagzu, were practically on the international frontier between Tibet and Ladakh.....The third post.....had been built on the east of Indian post at Daulat Beg Oldi near Karakoram pass and was more objectionable as it had moved further west by two miles'³⁹.

Thus, China's behaviour during the past five years was marked with non-cooperation and aggressiveness which disappointed India badly. Her optimism for friendly relations

with the 'Asian partner' in the spirit of Panch Sheel, was totally thrown to winds. The post-Panch Sheel conduct of China compelled India to change the version of her foreign policy. Under these circumstances 'forward policy' was presumably conceived at about this time (1961) with a view to stalling the advancing Chinese frontier line. It was decided to establish a few symbolic posts in what was thought to be decidedly Indian territory to keep up with the Chinese advance.⁴⁰

Hence, in view of the inherent Chinese threat to national security, the mould in the foreign policy had been taken to effect from 1958. The symbolic Chinese aggressiveness compelled India around late sixties to befriend United States. Apparently under those circumstances the US relationship was considered to be more helpful in India's security interest vis-a-vis China, than that of the Soviet Union. This was the reason that from 1958 onwards China's and India's US policies began to drift apart.....while India's relations with United States improved, China's deteriorated at the same time. The border conflict between India and China widened the gulf between the policies of the two countries towards the United States.⁴¹ This Indo-US rapprochement, too,

was a factor in the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations rapidly after 1958. The United States, being an ideological opponent, was not to be tolerated by China as India's companion. Thus, India's attempt to review the foreign policy towards America and to restore cordial relations with her from 1958 onwards was the result of security compulsion which she perceived in the face of People's China.

SOVIET UNION

The next objective in India's pro-communist venture after 1954, was to secure good relations with USSR for, it was a compelling security need to have a super power backing in the face of United States which was unilaterally supporting Pakistan through military aid. Soviet Union, too, was eager to win India on her side to counter-balance the US position in South Asia. 'Soviet policy towards India, after the Stalin era has pursued a move even course'⁴². Post-stalinization in Soviet Union started recognizing India's non-alignment as genuine. India's isolation from Baghdad Pact rather its condemnation, her role in Korean crisis 1959 and her increasing relationship with the communist China shunned away the illusion of Soviet Union which had previously been treating India as

'running dog of American imperialism' or as 'camp-follower' of the West. 'The real break-through came with Khrushchev's rise to power mainly because Khrushchev had a better understanding of the nature of Asian nationalism as also a better appreciation of neutrality'⁴³. And 'during the Khrushchev era India received considerably economic and military support from the Soviet Union and was assured of backing over Kashmir' in the hardly annals at the United Nations'⁴⁴. The Indo-Soviet friendship was not an one-sided attempt, but it was the result of mutual interests. 'Pakistan's involvement in anti-Soviet military pacts propelled the Soviet Union towards India.....Moscow's support for New Delhi's policies and interests helped to neutralise Washington's support of Islamabad and Soviet arms aid to India was more than a match for that received by Pakistan from its western patrons'⁴⁵. Obviously 'India's relations with the Soviet Union have traditionally been dominated by its security needs. US military aid to Pakistan in the mid-fifties played an important role in the establishment of friendly relations between New Delhi and Moscow'⁴⁶.

Now it can better be established that growing US interest in South Asia, with the positivity of making Pakistan an ally, posed a threat to the Indian security

during the mid-fifties, and therefore, in the broader strategic interests India sought to befriend USSR vis-a-vis United States. This relationship gained manoeuvrability particularly between 1958 to 1962 the period during which Sino-Indian relations were marked from bad to worse due to the frequent Chinese incursions on the traditionally recognized McMahon Line. The closer affinity developed due to the reciprocity from both the sides regarding each other's principles and systems. India appreciated the socialist pattern of society in Russia and moved ahead to follow more or less the same pattern for her socio-economic system. She liked the post-Stalin system of communization which was advocated and followed by Khrushchev.. Khrushchev advocated to adhere to communization through the peaceful way of social evolution, India was allergic of communism through violence, which was Stalin's apparent strategy for social reformation. On her part Russia, too, under Khrushchev started appreciating the democratic political system in India and realizing the role of non-alignment as a positive approach to global peace and cooperation. India's emphasis over the public sector economy suited to the Russian economic theory and due to this fact India obtained maximum aid for her public sector enterprises. 'Since the mid-fifties, Indo-Soviet friendship has been strongly welded through a many-dimensioned relationship involving practically every sector

of India's economy and wider spheres of its global relation'⁴⁷.

The undaunted cordial Indo-Russian relationship existed upto the early sixties but during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict Russia could not make practicable the proverb - 'friend in need'. She could not have the enough courage to isolate her 'comrade' against a 'non-communist' country. 'When China launched its massive attack on India on October 25, 1962, Moscow made a volte face and squarely sided with the Chinese'⁴⁸. Even at this juncture, too, Nehru, despite his firm adherence to non-alignment, did not overlook the graveness of the situation and did the same what any other statesman might have done in this situation. His approach was realistic in the absolute security interest of the nation. He lost no time in seeking military help from the West to stand with the Chinese onslaught. The general criticism of Nehru's policy, that it was not pragmatic to serve the security needs of India, is the result of the unawareness of his security considerations in relation to the foreign policy. Further, the critics do not spare Nehru for his request to the West for military help. It is commonly alleged that he compromised India's non-alignment. But

the critics basically overlook the fact that non-alignment was not a rigid phenomenon bypassing the national interests. It was formulated with sufficient flexibility so as to serve the broader interests of the nation. And within that specific framework of non-alignment Nehru sought the Western military aid during the Chinese aggression.

However, 'Nehru's friendly policy towards China, built on assumptions which facts were later to explode, brutally demonstrated the opposite of what he had set out to prove. It ended in violence and bloodshed, not peace; in bitter estrangement instead of closer friendship; and in the murky clouding of the two concepts of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment which constituted the sheet anchor of his foreign policy'⁴⁹.

In the period after 1962 conflict, there were three important factors which paved the way for India's foreign policy. First factor was the intention of the West regarding India. The real intention of United States and United Kingdom was to bargain through limited aid the Indian option regarding the Kashmir issue. 'Although the Western countries declared support to India in the conflict with China and indicated willingness to help in India's effort to build up her defence forces to meet the Chinese challenge,

very soon after the border war, particularly at the British instance the Western powers put pressure on India to negotiate with Pakistan the question of Kashmir and increasingly give the impression of tying this aid to India's acquiescence in playing ball in this regard⁵⁰. The second factor was growing Sino-Pak collusion after 1962. Pakistan on the one hand, foresaw the danger from India, as a potential enemy, which was getting military support from the West. While on the other, she felt India isolated from the communist world due to the Russian pro-Chinese attitude during the Sino-Indian conflict, hence she sought the closeness of at least one communist giant vis-a-vis India and to have a positive support on the issue of Kashmir. The third factor was the standing relationship between United States and Pakistan. The real intention of United States, by backing Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and at the same time by helping India through limited aid and thereby having a clutch over the Indian sub-continent, was to counter-balance the Soviet position in the region. Thus, the undue Western pressure regarding Kashmir, the Sino-Pak collusion and US-Pak relationship compelled India after 1962 to review her foreign policy in the vital interests of security.

The revival of foreign policy at this stage indicated India's leaning towards Soviets despite the fact that the latter had a pro-Chinese attitude during the 1962 conflict. In the broader security interests of the nation this was the only alternative to have closer ties with the Soviet Union in view of the US-Pak-China triangle. The 'triangle' as discussed in the previous paragraph posed grave security compulsion before the country and which was to be met only through a stronger super power stake. 'India sought Soviet friendship as a counter-weight to Western allied Pakistan, as a means of restraining China if worse comes to worse to neutralize the Soviet Union in case of Sino-Indian conflict'⁵¹.

Soviet Union was also equally interested to join hands with India and providing her with sufficient military and economic help. Although she could not give a neutral impression during the Sino-Indian conflict but by helping India during the post-conflict period Russia wanted to create her image as an admirer of non-alignment and to win the favour of non-aligned countries which was deemed essential to bring communization through social evolution. Besides, in terms of strategic objective 'the Soviet Union sought friendship with India to weaken the West in Asia, to build up India as an independent centre of power.

co-operating with the Soviet Union to preserve their mutual interests in Asia in general and South-east Asia in particular'⁵².

'The Soviet Union had offered just before the border war erupted the sale of a MIG manufacturing factory to India. The offer was not withdrawn despite the border war....Despite opposition in influential sections of US opinion, India was keen that the deal should go through'⁵³ Virtually this was the beginning of renewed Indo-Soviet relations. Russia became a principal supplier of military equipments to India. India's militarization, as a response to expansionist designs and aggressive posture of China, was undertaken by Soviet Union. 'By May, 1964, the total military aid that emanated from Moscow - 130 million dollars - was greater than the aid that was given by the United States during the same period'⁵⁴. Russia pledged for another fresh supply of armaments worth \$ 140 million in September 1964. Since, Nehru never accepted to yield to the pressure of the West and he wanted to establish an absolutely independent posture between the two super powers, 'the Soviet Campaign for the development of close friendship was naturally welcomed by the Nehru Government, for it not only implied general communist approbation of India's policy of non-alignment, but also permitted it to decrease its dependence on the West. This was, indeed, a

great triumph for Indian diplomacy'⁵⁶. The reciprocity in the Indo-Soviet relations had reached to its climax till the death of Prime Minister Nehru in May, 1964.

THE SHASTRI ERA, 1964-66

After Nehru's death Lal Bahadur Shastri resumed the office of Prime Minister and held the international affairs according to his own way, though, basically he followed the line of Nehru. As renowned diplomat T.N. Kaul has accepted that 'the void left by Nehru's passing away from the scene was there, but its poignancy was to some extent lessened because of Shastri succeeding him. I did not notice any significant departure from Nehru's policy'⁵⁶. In comparison to Nehru there was one underlying difference in Shastri's diplomatic approach. It was hardlining and decisive. Apparently Shastri's foreign policy approach was flexible and it was somewhat pragmatic in view of the nation's interests. In fact, instant decision-making was the basic characteristic of his foreign policy.

During the period of Prime Minister Shastri 'the new look in India's foreign policy calls first for the refurbishing of neighbourly relations with adjacent countries, beginning with the creation of a climate of emotional goodwill before launching on more active efforts nearer home and an attempt to achieve understanding on a

broader continental or global plane'⁵⁷. Non-alignment, Shastri said, 'will continue to be the fundamental basis of our approach to world problems in our relations with other nations. It will be our special endeavour to further strengthen our relations with neighbouring countries'⁵⁸. Undoubtedly, at a very complex stage of foreign affairs Shastri held the reign of the country. The unsettled issue of Kashmir was lingering on and due to it Indo-Pakistani relations were rapidly deteriorating. 'Shastri', in the present state of Indian public opinion which is irked and irritated by Pakistan starting a flirtation with China where India had left off or was summonly dumped, is in a peculiarly difficult and vulnerable position. In terms of practical politics he seems to have no other alternative but to work from the problem which is Kashmir'⁵⁹. The real complexity arose due to the moral support extended by China and material support extended by United States to Pakistan. Not only this, the Soviet Union too was interested actively in weaning away Pakistan from the West. Further, due to the apparent aggressiveness of Pakistan Shastri was facing a precarious challenge and now it depended upon his diplomatic skill to seek any solution in the interest of the nation.

Since Pakistan had become a factor in India's relationship with the Super powers, Shastri moved ahead with

his foreign policy model to resolve the differences with Pakistan. In the beginning of his period the position of the super powers regarding India was very much confusive. None of the super powers had taken an obvious stand. Although United States was aiding both India and Pakistan but her actual leaning was towards the latter. Britain also, due to the Commonwealth relationship, was interested in the sub-continent but only as a tail-twister of America. Similar was the position with the Soviet Union also. Her pro-Chinese impression during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and later her active efforts to befriend Pakistan to isolate the West from Asian affairs put question mark over the Indo-Soviet friendship which was mutually cultivated since 1954. More over 'the colourful Khrushchev had been overthrown in a bureaucratic coup d' etat. The new leaders were resolved on a reconciliation with China'⁶⁰. Hence, there was a dilemma before Shastri to set a definite course of action regarding India's relations with the super powers. Still, due to the moral and material support during the 1962 dispute, USA and UK became successful in making Shastri rely over the West in comparison to the Soviet Union. During the very days of such confusion and dilemma Shastri had to face the worst. Pakistan made a pre-meditated aggression over Rann of Kutch in April 1965 which resulted in an armed clash between the two nations.

This odd situation provided a chance to the West to intervene in the sub-continent and pressurize India accordingly. Prime Minister Harold Wilson invited Shastri and Ayub both for negotiation which resulted in a cease-fire-agreement signed between India and Pakistan on June 30, 1965 which alongwith the ending of fighting provided for restoration of status-quo as on January 1, 1965. Further this clash as a 'territorial dispute' in the Rann of Kutch provided for a bilateral negotiation and in case the negotiation failed it made the parties committed for referring the dispute to a tribunal. However, the negotiation started but throughout the whole process of bringing about the agreement Prime Minister Wilson prevailed upon Shastri. 'Shastri was subjected to gentle pressure and was induced to make concessions'⁶¹

Thus Shastri faced a complex strategic dilemma which caused a perception of threat directly from Pakistan. Obviously this was the security compulsion before him due to which he yielded to the pressure of the West to ward-off the inherent danger from Pakistan.

There is one thing quite apparent that in the early part of Shastri's period the Indo-Soviet relations

came to be cold. In this process of wavering bilateral relations three factors appear to be prominent. Firstly, there is an effective section in India which favoured the closeness with the United States. Secondly, by extending timely arms aid during the 1962 Sino-Indian dispute the Americans cultivated the strong public opinion in their favour. And lastly, the Soviet attempt to wean away Pakistan from People's China and the West was also responsible for it. These factors compelled Shastri to consider over the reformulation of foreign policy on pro-American lines. On the other hand the Soviet Union was convinced with Pakistan's plea that, despite her pro-West stand, she was not against the former. 'The Pakistan-
-is told the Soviets that their friendship with China did not stand in the way of developing friendly relations with the USSR and that their membership of SEATO and CENTO was only nominal and they would not support any move against the Soviet Union. They pleaded that supply of Soviet tanks to India was a threat to Pakistan without mentioning the Patton tanks they had received from the USA'⁶².

But Mr. T.N. Kaul, the then India's Ambassador to Soviet Union, played a crucial diplomatic role to avert the situation otherwise in the nation's interest. He made the Soviets aware of the real intention of Pakistan. 'I warned

them', Mr. Kaul said, 'in most frank and friendly manner, that we know Pakistani leaders better than they. If the Soviet Union fell for their propaganda, they would not only weaken India's friendship, but might even drive her into the western camp. It was for them to consider what they valued more - the friendship of non-aligned and democratic India or the doubtful promises of the unstable and shaky military dictatorship of Pakistan which had military alliances with the west and was also close to China'⁶³. On the other hand he tried to convince Shastri also about the advantages of Soviet friendship. Mr. Kaul said, 'I went to India for consultations and persuaded Shastri to pay a visit to the Soviet Union in response to their invitation. He saw my point and, with the support and advice of others, accepted my recommendation.....'⁶⁴.

Shastri visited USSR in May 1965 and he realized the mutual interests for the common bond of friendship between the two nations. 'This strategy worked', Mr. Kaul says, 'and we were able to set the Indo-Soviet friendship again on a firm footing. The Soviets soon discovered that Pakistan's main aim was to weaken India and grab our territory in Kutch and Kashmir'⁶⁵.

'The settlement of the Kutch dispute and the reference of the Pakistani claims to an International Tribunal did

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not result in improvement of relations between India and Pakistan. 'The evidence suggests that it only whetted the appetite of Pakistan's military rulers. Pakistan was determined to absorb Kashmir.... The evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy in the first seven years of Ayub's dictatorship can be explained only in terms of the Kashmir problem. It was ultimately Pakistan's uncontrollable urge to annex and possess Kashmir that led to war in 1965'.⁶⁶ The war between the two started on September 6, 1965. After seventeen days of fierce fighting the war, as a result of the Security Council's cease fire resolution, ended on September 23, 1965. Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh's assessment of the 1965 conflict is worth mention. 'People may be right in saying that we achieved nothing. They, however fail to grasp the significance of the consequences if Pakistan had succeeded in its designs. After all, she was the one to make the first move and she could not have done so without over-ensuring her chances vis-a-vis India. That her aims were thwarted in toto, both political and military, is feather in India's cap'.⁶⁷

The Soviet Union, because of taking extra strategic interests in South Asia, actively supported the cease-fire resolution at the UN Security Council and immediately as the war comes to an end she offered her good offices to India and Pakistan to come for negotiation at Tashkent. 'Of

course the Soviet leaders had their own interest in this. It would be a feather in their cap and steal the thunder from the West and China. It would create a friendly area in the soft, southern underbelly of the USSR..... It would decrease the western, especially American, influence in Pakistan and also isolate China⁶⁸. Thus, in this strategic perspective, 'The Soviet initiative was an earnest effort for their new even handed policy towards the two South Asian States'⁶⁹

India not only accepted the offer, but yielded to the Soviet pressure at the conference by agreeing to withdraw across the Punjab and Sind-Rajasthan frontier and to vacate the strategic points in Kashmir captured during the conflict. The inherent security considerations compelled Shastri at that point of time to adopt the policy of appeasement towards the Soviets by conceding to their will, for 'Soviet friendship for India was important, especially in view of the Chinese threat and the pro-Pakistani stance of the West'⁷⁰. It is said that Prime Minister Shastri could not stand the mental strain and expired due to heart failure.

THE PERIOD OF MRS. GANDHI (1966-1970)

Mrs. Indira Gandhi resumed the office of Prime Minister in January 1966. During the early days of her period she perceived that pro-American mould of foreign policy would better serve the nation's interest. Hence, she started the foreign policy formulation with the West-oriented tone. She visited United States in 1967. This re-orientation of the foreign policy took place because of Mrs. Gandhi's security consideration. She felt isolation from the Soviet side due to her dual role to please India on one side and to snatch Pakistan from the clutches of United States and to isolate her from China on the other. 'Soviet leaders were trying to befriend Pakistan again and were thinking seriously of giving some military supplies to her. Mrs. Gandhi told them in no uncertain terms what its repercussions on Indo-Soviet relations would be'.⁷¹ She started strengthening her relations with the United States as an alternative approach in the wake of Soviet Union wishing to win Pakistan on her part. 'It is also known that the CIA and the Indian IB jointly planted a plutonium-powered American monitoring device on Mount Nanda Devi in 1967, with her obvious approval, for spying on Chinese nuclear development'.⁷² The process was, however, maintained till 1968, but the Nixon administration lacked to extend the reciprocity in

relation Mrs. Gandhi could not achieve the expected strategic objective from the American relationship. Since Nixon did not reconcile with Kennedy's 'global strategy' in general and the 'Asian Concept' in particular, 'he propounded his' Asian Doctrine' which meant, in effect, reducing the Soviet influence in Asia, cutting India to size, helping America's client States and exploiting Sino-Soviet differences by befriending China and antagonizing the Soviet Union'⁷³. Nixon wanted to establish detente with People's China by breaking the twenty years old ideological stalemate in order to weaken the Soviet strategic prospects in Asia. Regarding the sub-continent his attitude towards Pakistan became more sympathetic and helpful. Since 1969 Pakistan was making efforts to establish rapprochement between America and China and she had managed the Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing. Her inherent object was to create an anti-India lobby strong enough to weaken India's strategic position even if supported by Soviets.

Mrs. Gandhi foresaw the future strategic equation against India and apprehended its impact over the national security and it was therefore in 1969 she 'rationalized the increasingly pro-Soviet and anti-American orientation of her foreign policy which had become necessary in the

sixties and early seventies....for the strategic interest of the country'⁷⁴. The pro-Soviet turn in India's foreign policy at the verge of the end of sixties was due to the threat perception which Mrs. Gandhi visualized in the Sino-Pak-US triangle obviously in making. 'The late sixties and the early seventies witnessed the emergence of a USA-Pakistan-China axis in South Asia, which appeared to crystallize during the liberation movement in Bangladesh. This development more or less compelled India to sign the famous twenty-years Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, which has unmistakable strategic overtones'⁷⁵.

THE NEIGHBOURING IMPACT

India's neighbourhood geo-politically constitutes a separate region in the Asian continent which is popularly known as South Asia in the post-world war international system. This region includes India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka. The instability in the region, caused by super powers and China, cast its direct effect over the security environment of India. 'South Asia may not be an area of vital strategic interest to them (super powers), yet in pursuit of their global rivalry they attempt to use their arms

transfers, economic and food aid and even political support to authoritarian regimes lending them upon legitimacy as instruments of cold war diplomacy'⁷⁶.

Similarly, Chinese 'effective military presence in Tibet and Sinking has its impact on the countries of South Asia. Apart from its armed conflict with India along the far flung frontier, China has kept up active cooperation with Pakistan which has both bilateral as well as regional, if not global implication'⁷⁷.

The region, since the early fifties, became an important sphere of India's foreign policy operation due to Pakistan's standing hostility and China's subversive activities as a part of her expansionist manoeuvre. Further 'as the largest and most populous country of this region, India is naturally looked upon by these countries with a feeling of respect, hope and confidence and sometimes with awe, suspicion and fear. There have thus been many ups and downs in India's relations with these countries'⁷⁸. Now, in this context India's foreign policy is analyzed especially in the context of Pakistan.

PAKISTAN

This should be accepted beyond any inhibition that super powers interference in the region started only due to the envious attitude of Pakistan against India.

There was a fear-psychosis in Pakistan's mind about India due to her size and potential and this fear-psychosis prompted Pakistani rulers to seek military aid from United States in 1954 under the provisions of mutual defence agreement. This pro-Western alternative opted by Pakistan was naturally to affect the process of India's foreign policy and under this strategic environment India, in view of her strict security needs, was compelled to reshape the foreign policy leaning towards Russia. Yet, she was getting aid from the West also. The underhand US policy in the sub-continent was to throw weight on the side of Pakistan vis-a-vis India to disturb the sub-continental balance and fish in the troubled water. During the fifties the US aid-policy for Pakistan was marked with anti-communist move.

The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 gave a turn to Pakistan's foreign policy. It is visible in three ways - 'continued friendship towards the aid-giving West, with political reservation, normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union, and a friendly attitude to China.....'⁷⁹ . The immediate repercussion of this change was that the West intensified its military aid programme for India in comparison to Pakistan. On July 4, 1963 President Ayub said that 'Western arms aid to India would drive the smaller nations⁸⁰ of the region into the shelter of China' . But this was

beyond the tolerance of the United States that a puppet state giving her platform for the containment of communism and still more an ally of the West should go into the clutches of People's China. The United States, therefore, played a trick, by way of a pretext, to turn her back to India. India's demand for supersonic F104 fighter planes which were already supplied to Pakistan, was turned down by the United States. This was done to add superiority to Pakistani military posture. Consequently the security requirements forced India in 1963 to look to the Soviet Union for defence purchases including MIGs. In December 1963, there was a popular uprising in Kashmir. This was a premeditated and conspired plot at the instance of Pakistan. This was all with an objective to pay emphasis over the issue of plebiscite. The another factor which was important in this context was the intensive US military aid to Pakistan.

Pakistan made an aggression over India in September 1965. This is somehow, another factor that 'the US may or may not have liked Pakistani invasions of India. But the American rulers were quite happy to see the balance of power in the region artificially disturbed to India's disfavour'⁸¹.

Of course, despite the US material support Pakistan faced shocking military reverse against India in the

conflict. China too, condemned India to the most and to her best she supported Pakistan. She branded India as an aggressor in the 1965 conflict. Thus, the conflict evidenced the US-Pak-China collusion which compelled India to reshape her foreign policy in view of the future security orientations. This was the security compulsion before India that she unconditionally accepted the Soviet offer for mediation at Tashkent and on the negotiation table too she fully yielded to the desire of the mediator without a least reservation. 'No doubt the Tashkent meet was a historic moment. With Soviet assistance a break-through had been achieved. An atmosphere of cautious optimism prevailed'⁸². The agreement prima facie put India at loss but in view of the strategic environment which prevailed till the end of sixties India availed a favourable power-balance in the region.

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CHAPTER - FIVE

FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY COMPULSIONS 1970-76

INDIRA GANDHI'S ERA

The year 1971 occurred as a turning point in the history of India's foreign policy particularly in the context of security compulsions. The Sino-US-Pak triangle posed a serious threat to the nation's security in the year 1971. India, in view of the seriousness of the threat, signed a twenty years Treaty of Peace, Friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Although this treaty was well within the framework of non-alignment, yet the United States and other western powers treated this treaty relationship as India's military alliance with USSR. The United States operated this triangle to secure her interests in South Asia vis-a-vis Soviet Union. She, in collusion with People's Republic of China, used Pakistan as a lever against India to maintain her dominance in the region. Thus, the 'triangle' became an important aspect in the security considerations of India in the seventies and she required to reshape her foreign policy in accordance with the changing diplomatic scenerio in the globe

THE GLOBAL IMPACT

The global diplomacy took a metamorphic turn in

the year 1971. The Sino-US detente was, however, established as the result of vigorous spadework done by Pakistan. The process of rapprochement between the two ideological adversaries had already started in the late sixties.

Although India welcomed this rapprochement but this was a matter of grave concern to her security orientations.

'The governments of China and the United States have been aiding and abetting Pakistan in its war on Bangla Desh with grave consequences to India. So India saw in the Chou-Kissinger talks some traces of an anti-Indian stands'¹. In the global analysis the Indo-US relationship is being taken at the first instance.

THE UNITED STATES

In the year 1971 the East Pakistan issue loomed as the main factor in deciding the nature of relationship between India and the United States. Despite gaining the thumping majority the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was denied by West Pakistani Military regime to form a government in East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan, therefore, started a massive movement under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib for the restoration of democracy. Gen. Yahya Khan, the military ruler of West Pakistan, started suppressing the voice of the people by committing genocide. The military

crackdown started on March 25, 1970. The inhuman atrocities by Pakistani armed forces started over the innocent people who, unable to withstand the horror, began crossing into the Indian territory. Thus, the influx of refugees posed a serious economic and security problem before the Indian Government. Mrs. Gandhi in the Lok Sabha said, 'It is a problem created by calculated genocide that is resulting not only in the murder of tens of thousands of men, women and children but also forcing many more to seek refuge and shelter in India. It is a problem that threatens the peace and security of India, and indeed, of South-east Asia'². But the refugees were not to be sent back to East Pakistan unless the peace was ascertained there. Till that time the peoples movement in East Pakistan had taken the shape of a full fledged liberation-struggle with the main object of establishing Bangla Desh as an independent nation. Thus, in favour of democracy and in support of the people of East Pakistan, facing the inhuman atrocities in the hands of Pakistani forces, India adopted the policy which naturally sided with Bangla Desh. The United States, in view of her strategic interests in South Asia, sided with Pakistan because the 'US administration, till that time, was convinced about the probability of Soviet dominance in the South Asian affairs through India'³. However, the United States carried the impression that India was being supported by USSR for her pro-Mujib stand. And this was

therefore, the basic reason that the USA decided to supply arms to Pakistan. In November 1970 speaking in a debate in the Lok Sabha on US decision to supply arms to Pakistan the External Affairs Minister Swarn Singh said 'Such a step will not only increase tension in the sub-continent and lead to arms race, but will also make Pakistan more intransigent towards India and render normalization of our relations with Pakistan more difficult'⁴

President Nixon had already started the revival of US Asian policy since late sixties. The major aspect of this revival was the Sino-US collusion which abruptly changed the global diplomatic scenerio. As a part of this policy-revival Nixon decided to arm Pakistan in response to the pre-conceived Indo-Soviet collusion. The Bangla Desh issue added more to the US suspicion. Thus, a new concept came into being in the strategic environment in Asia. 'Hopefully the new concept now sought to be created with US-China-Pakistan at its core would be more acceptable in Asia and would enable USA to continue to exercise a dominating influence in this region'⁵. Unhesitating and without caring for its effects over her relations with India the United States continued to supply arms to Pakistan. A report published in the New York Times of June 22, 1971 stated the shipment of US arms to Pakistan. Replying to a question of Chitṭa Basu on this report as to what action

would be taken in view of this 'hostile or unfriendly act' the External Affairs Minister Swarn Singh said, 'of course, it is for us to decide as to what action we may like to take or we may not like to take. About describing it as a hostile or an unfriendly act, these expressions have certain connotations in the international life and we have left the US authorities in no doubt about our disappointment on this attitude of theirs'⁶. But this was all a futile attempt. The Indian reaction could not have any positive effect over the US decision. On July 7, 1971 a statement was made by Senator Church which repeated the US decision of supplying military equipment worth \$ 35 million to Pakistan *. Making a statement in the Lok Sabha over the reported American decision Swaran Singh said, 'Government feel that the supply of arms to Pakistan by any country in the present context amounts to condonation of genocide in Bangla Desh and encouragement to the continuation of atrocities by the military rulers of Pakistan.... We have left US government in no doubt about the dangerous implications of such a policy on the situation in Bangla Desh and on peace and stability of the sub-continent and the region as a whole'⁷.

* On July 8, 1971, a State spokesman stated that 'the average approximate figure over the last five fiscal years, has been in the order of \$ 10 to 16 million a year'. - The Lok Sabha Debates, fifth series, Vol. V, No.36, Col. 118.

The deterioration in the Indo-US relations had actually started since the mid of the sixties. The Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 was the point from where the straining of bilateral relations started and the distance continued to increase because of the American suspicion about India being subjected to Soviet influence. The difference deepened in the year 1971 due to the crisis of East Pakistan. India could not convince United States about the fact in East Pakistan that democracy was being buried there through genocidal suppression by West Pakistani military regime and India was being economically burdened by the incessant pouring in of refugees who were leaving their country due to the inhuman atrocities. 'Nixon was so cold blooded and indifferent to the people's suffering that the agony of 10 million refugees meant nothing to him'⁸. On the other hand the thinking of US administration was completely clouded by the misconception that India had ill designs against Pakistan and she wanted to cut it to size by parting East Pakistan and dominating it militarily. Working according to this thesis United States decided to strengthen the military might of Pakistan by arming it heavily. 'The Indo-Soviet Treaty widened the gulf between the USA and India as Washington could be under no illusion that the Treaty was meant to forestall any American or Chinese moves to apply physical pressure on India'⁹.

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Mrs. Gandhi visited United States on November 6, 1971 with the primary objective to convince President Nixon on the issue of East Pakistan. But Nixon administration seemed to be determined to save the 'integrity' of Pakistan at the first priority and therefore, the US President during his talks with Mrs. Gandhi insisted on the point of withdrawal of Indian troops from the border. He attached not even secondary importance to the problem which India was facing gravely due to the influx of 9.5 million refugees. Since Mr. Nixon was biased in his attitude to extend active support to Pakistan with a view to maintain military parity in the subcontinent, Mrs. Gandhi, too, did not accede to his points because issue involved in the core of sub-continental peace was the political solution of the crisis in East Pakistan. This was to be sought through an amicable settlement between Sheikh Mujib, the Awami League leader and the military regime of West Pakistan. The withdrawal of Indian troops from the border was not at all the issue in picture. However, despite continued efforts, the Indo-US relationship reached the lowest level.

INDO-PAK WAR - 1971

Pakistan's open hostility came to sight when on November 28 heavy concentration¹⁰ of Pakistani troops was

noticed in Chaprar, a border town facing Ranbirsinghpura sector in Jammu. On November 29 'two Mirage planes intruded into Indian air-space over Dera Babananak and Kasuwala'¹¹, north of Ravi river at 1.25 p.m. Further, the Pakistani troops were reported to have demolished a portion of a defence wall¹² in the Sialkot sector. 'The military strategy of Pakistan appeared to be to make inroads at our sensitive points on the western border and thus bring to bear upon India some pressure from this side'¹³. Pakistan initiated the conflict in the Eastern sector too. Heavy Pakistani shelling of civilian areas in West Dinajpur was reported on November 30 and scattered fighting took place there. On the same day the Indian troops repulsed the Pakistani counter-attack in the Balurghat¹⁴ hilly area.

Thus, with a view to materialize her military strategy Pakistan, encouraged by US material and moral support, mounted the aggression over the western borders of India on December 3, 1971.

Immediately after the breakout of the hostility the Nixon administration demonstrated its opposition by initiating two actions. First it suspended the economic aid worth \$ 87.6 million on December 6, 1971 which was in pipeline to India. Second on December 9 a secret meeting of the White House Special Action Group decided to despatch

the 7th fleet to the Bay of Bengal on a pretext to evacuate 47 Americans from East Pakistan. But the real mission of the Fleet was to exert pressure on India indirectly through the show of force so that she should stop fighting. 'Enterprise', the nuclear powered aircraft carrier with 100 fighter-bombers, reconnaissance planes, helicopters and small cargo planes entered the Bay of Bengal on December 12, 1971. It totally failed in its tactical mission¹⁵ to intimidate India and divert her tactical attention so as to weaken her air-cum-naval activities to the advantage of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan.

The United States analyzed the sub-continental problem absolutely in terms of 'global balance of power'. 'It sided with Pakistan because India was on friendly terms with Soviet Union'¹⁶ That is why she preferred to take up the diplomatic adventure through the 'Seventh fleet' to establish the strategic superiority in the South Asian region. But this proved rather a misadventure which reaped nothing except the escalation of the conflict. The Indo-Pak war which would have ended most probably on December 11 continued further a week ahead. Naturally as a strategic response to the US Naval action the units of Soviet Fleet, too, proceeded through the Arabian Sea which was symbolic of complicating the situation. This all proves the diplomatic folly of the United States which

fuelled the tension in the region due to her wrongfully assessed regional situation and mistakenly projected global designs.

The United States action regarding the Seventh Fleet moving upto the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan was the worst exposure of American intention in the sub-continent and indeed it marred the further prospects of normalizing the Indo-US relations in the coming years after the December-71 conflict. The US objective of military parity in the sub-continent failed and India, due to her vital role in the creation of Bangla Desh, emerged as a major power in South Asia. Regarding the normalization of relations some attempts were made from both the sides but due to the lack of willingness on the part of the Nixon-administration no relationship could be resumed in positive terms.

In his Annual Foreign Policy Message submitted to the Congress on February 9, 1972 President Nixon said 'we are prepared now for a serious dialogue with India on the future of our relations'¹⁷. But this declaration was not at all a plain commitment for establishing an intimate relationship with India. It was bound with the US condition that 'if India has an interest in maintaining balanced relationship with all major powers we are prepared

to respond constructively'¹⁸. The stress over the 'maintenance of balanced relationship' with all major powers was aimed at weakening the gravity of Indo-Soviet relationship. It was aimed at upholding the supremacy of United States vis-a-vis Soviet Union in South Asia. The 'balanced relationship' was Nixon's move to draw India closer to United States by undermining the Indo-Soviet treaty. This was automatically deemed to the advantage of the strategic posture of Sino-US-Pak tie-up against the tie-up of India and the Soviet Union. Although Nixon's proposal was bound with the conditions which were not acceptable to India, yet, the latter equally responded for improving her relations with the United States. In August 1972 Mrs. Gandhi expressed her desire that 'India was willing to patch-up relations with the United States but Nixon Administration has no real desire to improve relations with India'¹⁹. However, there could not be any improvement in the bilateral relationship, for, the conditions put up by Nixon Administration were detrimental to the India's security interests in the region.

In the year 1973 President Nixon underlined economic relations based on 'reciprocity and mutuality' as the basis of US foreign policy. But, still in the case of India it could not materialize with positive return due to American theory of 'balanced relationship' with all the

major powers. The US Administration, on the one hand, wanted to strengthen the deterrent posture of Pakistan against India and on the other, it wanted to cultivate friendship with India so that it does not fall exclusively in the Soviet hand. With this object the US Administration, in March 1973, renewed its decision of resuming the supply of arms to Pakistan in pursuance of the 'new theory developed by Joseph Sisco'²⁰. The debating members in the House on March 13, 1973 opposed the US move of resuming the arms supply to Pakistan. Agreeing with the plea of Samar Guha that the resumption of US arms supply to Pakistan 'will seriously endanger the prospect of peace in the sub-continent' the External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh said, 'I do agree with him that this will come in the way of establishing durable peace in the sub-continent, this will also come in the way of normalisation of relations and strengthening of friendly relations between India and the United States'²¹

Thus, the process of normalization remained out of practice because in view of the prevailing security environment India could not forego the US move of supplying arms to Pakistan, for, the arms supply was exclusively used as an instrument for implementing²² the South Asian policy. During the following year also the conditions remained more or less the same as in 1973.

The US activities in consolidating the Diego-Garcia as an air-cum-naval base directly affected the naval security of India. The US Ambassador in India made a statement on March 4, 1974 at Madras that 'the Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean is more important to USA than to India, and USA's interests there are more valuable than those of India'. He further added 'why call it the Indian Ocean ?. One may call it the Madagascar Sea'²³. India's Foreign Minister declared in the House in an abundantly clear terms that 'we do not accept the assertion that Diego Garcia base is more important to the United States. The distance from United States to Diego-Garcia is perhaps more than 7000 Kms. where as it is closer to us. In fact not only to us, but this is a matter of concern to all the littoral states surrounding the Indian Ocean'²⁴. The US Task Force with Air craft carrier 'Hancock' had already entered into the Indian Ocean in November 1973. On March 12, 1974 Mr. Jyotirimoy Basu informed the House about the sailing of US nuclear powered Air Craft carrier 'Kitty Hawk' in the Indian Ocean. The External Affairs Minister on the receipt of this information said 'it is with concern therefore that we have received the information by our Embassy in Washington about the arrival of Air Craft carrier 'Kitty Hawk'. Whether it is a replacement or an addition, it supports the belief that US Naval forces are

intending to stay in the Indian Ocean for a considerable period of time'²⁵.

Apparently India's policy regarding Indian Ocean has been to make it a 'zone of peace' free from super power rivalry. Hence, US naval presence in the Indian Ocean occurred as a clash of interests between the two nations and it again obstructed the process of normalizing relations. There happened one thing more which seriously deepened the mutual differences between India and the United States. India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in May 1974 created an adverse impression before the US administration that India was diverting her resources from public needs to non-productive purposes for the sake of gaining military superiority against Pakistan. The New York Times reacted that India was squandering her resources on nuclear experiment at the time when her 600 million population was facing poverty²⁶. Since the United States wants to retain her nuclear monopoly she criticized the Pokharan explosion²⁷. The US fell into the impression that India was heading towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons technology²⁸ under the cover of peaceful nuclear explosion. This impression was confirmed due to 'the intensification of Pakistan's pressure on the United States for the supply of more sophisticated weapons'²⁹.

Again there was some hope of improving bilateral relations with the visit of the US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger came to India on October 27, 1974 on a three day visit. He expressed his conviction of recognizing India's new role as a major power in South Asia. With the emerging realities of global and regional politics he appreciated India's role of non-alignment. But Kissinger's mention of Simla Agreement as a process strengthening the normalization of Indo-US relations undoubtedly evidences the fact that USA was interested in maintaining ties with India only on the condition that the latter should have smooth relations with Pakistan also. 'The warming up of Indo-US relations' he said, 'began inevitably as the Simla process began and had proceeded and strengthened as that process had proceeded and strengthened'³⁰.

But any sort of betterment, however, in Indo-US relations could not be materialized due to American policy of maintaining military parity in the Indian sub-continent. On February 24, 1975 the US administration announced to lift the embargo on the sale of military equipments to other countries in order to facilitate the arms supply to Pakistan. The US spokesman Robert Anderson said 'I should emphasize that this a 'each-only policy...

We are not planning to provide any equipment on a great military assistance basis or on credit'³¹. Although the State Department tried to justify the decision of arms supply pleading it for cash³¹ purposes exclusively with the commercial object but this decision was quite inconsistent to the Indian policy of regional peace and stability since it was basically to encourage arms race in the sub-continent. Mrs. Indira Gandhi reacted that the US decision to resume the arms supply to Pakistan would deteriorate the process of normalization between India and Pakistan. She said that it was not at all genuine to justify the arms supply to Pakistan on the ground that India, for the sake of achieving self-sufficiency, was developing her defence industry'³². Thus, it was again going to jeopardize the security environment in the region. Hence, under this security compulsion and looking for the future shape of power-politics in the region India protested the US arms policy and thus the gap between the two, despite mutual efforts for the last three years, continued as earlier.

On June 25, 1975 the Emergency rule was imposed in India. Although the US State Department did say nothing on the ground that it was India's internal affair but the American Press denounced it to the depth. The US administration viewed the imposition of emergency³³ as starting of 'totalitarian rule in India which was going to put the

institution of democracy to an end. President Gerald Ford said, ' I think it is a very sad development and I hope that in time there could be a restoration of democratic processes as we know them in the United States'.³³ Obviously, the US reaction to India's emergency rule was biased and it created a void in the bilateral relations.

Infact, this was a period of stalemate in the process of foreign policy making. Basically the Indian emerged as the aftermath of the declaration of Emergency. The period from June 1975 to the beginning of 1977 indicates the lack of initiative from either of the sides for rapprochement to re-establish bilateral friendship. The another important factor freezing the relationship between them was that United States could not deprive herself of the arms supply to Pakistan to have a clutch over the sub-continental military balance as a part of her South Asian policy. In 1976 she agreed to supply Sidewinder missiles (AA system) worth \$ 14.2 million to Pakistan. The Indo-US relations, therefore, remained in stale throughout the duration of emergency rule.

THE USSR

The Sino-US rapprochement in process had already affected the global setting. 'A Pindi-Peking-Washington

axis was in the process of formation'³⁴. The common object of United States and China was to apprehend India in support of Pakistan in general and US attempt to put weight in favour of Pakistan in particular to counteract the Soviet influence from the South Asian region. The crisis in East Pakistan had upset the regional stability. The massive outflow of refugees due to the atrocities committed by military junta in East Pakistan brought India into open confrontation with Pakistan. In the first week of July 1971 the US intention was clear that she was going to supply the military equipments worth \$ 35 million to Pakistan. At this juncture the creation of a balance of relationship was essential for India to counteract the effects of triangular relationship already existing in favour of Pakistan. This became the relevant security compulsion which forced India to seek a foreign policy option in order to acquire a position of strength against the potential adversaries.

Hence, in view of the inherent security compulsion India entered into treaty relationship with USSR with the object of creating a favourable strategic environment in South Asia. Mr. Swarn Singh said 'The treaty will, we are convinced, provide a stabilising factor in favour of peace, security and development not only of our two countries, but the region as a whole'³⁵. Within the basic

structure of non-alignment the treaty with the Soviet Union served the immediate security interests of the nation. Since, the trend of the regional or global strategic environment is not static, but is always a changing phenomenon, it had, therefore, become unavoidable for India to set-up a new diplomatic equation according to the need of the time. The treaty appeared as a flexible and dynamic exposition of the policy of non-alignment. The Foreign Minister asserted 'There is a change in the configuration of various world forces. Our policy of non-alignment is a dynamic policy which can be adopted to these changing situations'³⁶.

Therefore, in view of the complexity of the situation the 'Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was signed between India and the Soviet Union on August 8, 1971. The strategic utility of the treaty has been positively proved. It served as a deterrent against the Sino-US-Pak axis and balanced India's position in the eventuality of war with Pakistan. It acted as a deterrent³⁷ against any other power having ill designs on India even during the years following the December - 71 war. As a balance of relationship it put a curb over the US activities in the sub-continent as well as in South Asia which might have proved detrimental to the strategic interests of India.

The Soviet Union extended arms supply to India to keep up her military superiority against Pakistan which was being aided jointly by China and the United States. In 1971 quite earlier to the conflict, the USSR entered into three agreements, with India for supplying Medium Tanks, SA-2 Missiles (SA system) and APC infantry carriers. The delivery was expected in India by November 1971. However, 'it was obvious that few could understand the compulsions by the world power realities. There could be no doubt that Indo-Soviet agreement was a crucial and decisive factor in the resolution of the crisis'³⁸.

As it was natural that the exposure of US reaction was quite adverse to the Indo-Soviet Treaty. They calculated it as a growing Soviet influence³⁹ in South Asia in response to Sino-US thaw and at the same time and moreover, India's non-alignment⁴⁰ was treated as watered down or abridged because of the Article IX of the treaty. Although there is nothing in the Article IX which is contrary to the basic structure of India's non-alignment. The article simply refers to the willingness of each contracting party to enter into mutual consultation to seek ways to ward off an aggression or a threat thereof if there was any over either of them. But most of the pro-US Western Press treated it otherwise. The leading

media of United Kingdom 'The Times' reacted by defining the treaty as a 'non alignment' between India and Russia, though it did not accept it as 'an ideological alignment'. Mr. Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabha on August 9, 1971, 'It (the treaty) strengthens our policy of non-alignment, respect for which is expressly mentioned in the treaty'⁴¹. Since the basic concept of non-alignment has been to keep India out of the power politics of blocs but it does not mean to preclude her from taking necessary security measures *.

The Indo-Soviet ties were further cemented in the following years on the basis of the 1971 treaty. 'The treaty lent a new dimension to the Indo-Soviet relationship wherein Soviet backing came to be crucial for warding off the most serious threat to India's integrity and socio-economic polity'⁴². The friendship gained depth, for, there was mutual respect for equality, independence and freedom of action. On most of the strategic or political issues, concerning global or regional affairs, both the nations adopted common approach. Regarding Indian Ocean Moscow upheld the need for making it a zone of peace so that it could be used freely by all the nations. The Soviet Union viewed that it should be open to all for trade and the foreign bases be eliminated to keep it free from big power rivalry.

* K. Subrahmanyam, The Mother Land, 19 August, 1971.

The Soviet communist Party Chief Brezhnev came to India on November 26, 1973 for a five-day visit. His visit was aimed at strengthening the bilateral relations on the basis of joint political approach and economic relationship. Brezhnev put up the proposal for Collective Security in Asia. India did not make satisfactory response to it. Moscow, too, did not press India for endorsing the concept. Brezhnev expressed his idea behind the Asian security concept as to develop and enrich mutual relationship among Asian nations on the basis of goodwill and peaceful co-existence. While speaking about the social development he highlighted the role of internal forces within a country. 'We have always believed, 'he said and 'continue to believe that the choice of the road of social development is an internal affair of each nations own motives, needs, socio-political traditions and the alignment of forces'⁴³ The 'economic agreement' between the two nations for a period of 15 years was the significant aspect of Brezhnev's visit which proved to be helpful in economic consolidation of India. On most of the international issues, e.g. Vietnam, West Asia, admission of Bangla Desh to UN and US-Soviet detente, both the nations shared the common approach. Steps for normalising the tension in the sub-continent appeared as the underlying theme of summit discussions between the two leaders Brezhnev and Mrs. Gandhi.

The period from 1974 to 1976 represented intensive collaboration between India and the USSR on trade and commerce. Both signed a protocol on January 4, 1974 for developing the oil industry. Another agreement was signed between Indian space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Soviet Academy of Sciences on September 13, 1975 with the object of providing assistance for the development of satellite programme in India. A five-year trade agreement was signed on April 15, 1976 for boosting up the trade turnover to the tune of \$ 43,460 million during the period of 1976 to 1980. Under the provisions of Indo-Soviet trade protocol signed in December 1976 the Soviet Union agreed to supply crude oil to India on a long term basis.

The period of Emergency appeared as a phase of enhanced trade collaboration and economic activities between India and the USSR. The latter justified the imposition of Emergency as a measure for stabilizing the forces of socio-economic development to help the poor classes. The Soviet Union supported India's domestic policy which aimed at bringing the socio-economic justice to the poor masses. She regarded India's policy on non-alignment as the right way to ensure peace and to fight colonialism and racialism. In his report to the 25th CPSU Congress Brezhnev⁴⁵ on February 24, 1976, expressed his appreciation

for India's foreign policy working for peace and the domestic policy working for the social and economic well being of the people. He upheld the importance of Peace Treaty of 1971 which cemented the Indo-Soviet relationship and this bilateral relationship worked as a stabilising factor in the region as well as in the continent.

The analysis from 1971 to 1976 establishes that the improvement of bilateral relations was based on mutual needs arising out of the configuration in the pattern of global relationship. Ostensibly it appears to the critics as the one-sided effort made by India in the wake of confrontation with Pakistan which was being supported by United States and Peoples China. But the factual analysis reveals that it was the demand of the situation which compelled both the nations according to their interests to get closer and consolidate the bilateral relations.

The Sino-US detente in the early seventies which seemed apparently committed to support Pakistan vis-a-vis India, created a void for Soviet power-equation in Asia in general as well as South Asian region in particular. India, being a big Asian nation with sufficient manpower and resources, was the best alternative to Moscow for forming the equation in the continent. Moreover, most

of the issues taken up by the Congress regime such as, socio-economic parity leading towards socialistic pattern of society and efforts for strengthening the anti-rightist forces inside the country, co-incided with the Soviet viewpoint. Since second half of the fifties the Soviets had started appreciating India's non aligned foreign policy due to its emphasis to continue struggle against imperialism, colonialism, later neo-colonialism, racialism and arms race for ensuring peace, security and co-operation in the globe. The Soviet Union had started taking interest in India's industrialisation since late fifties and she extended maximum economic assistance to the latter but the real Soviet interest in the political affairs of the sub-continent started from the time of Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. And since then active Soviet support to India leading to the mutual closeness is undoubtedly on record.

The reshuffling in the interaction of big powers certainly cast its effect over the strategic interests of India. The Sino-US-Pak axis aimed at isolating India from the web of regional politics and putting compulsions before her so that she could yield in favour of Pakistan. In such a situation it became quite essential for India to consolidate her existing link with the Soviet Union. The 1971 treaty simply gave a new version to that link to meet the new challenges arising out of the new configuration

of powers. Had USSR been inactive during 1971 affairs she would have lost her strategic posture in South Asia to the diplomatic victory of United States. Thus, it was not one sided attempt on the part of India to review her relations with the Soviet Union in 1971 but it was the reciprocity of interests which prompted both the powers for restructuring their relationship to new ends.

THE PEOPLE'S CHINA

The Sino-Indian relations started deteriorating fast after 1958 due to the Chinese aggressive attitude and uncompromising outlook over the border dispute. This antagonistic attitude resulted in the form of Chinese aggression in October 1962 which caused a humiliating setback to India. Although, during this eight-years period from 1962 to 1970 there was a complete diplomatic pause between India and China, yet, during this gap the latter did not keep herself away from the activities which may be termed unfriendly if not exactly hostile. 'In 1965 China had given \$ 250 million worth of military aid to Pakistan and promised another \$ 200 million in 1970'⁴⁶.

However, the security oriented analysis of China's behaviour with India during this period of diplomatic

stalemate shows that the real objective of her diplomacy against India has been to undermine latter's image as a big non-aligned power in Asia. The communist China, since her birth in 1949, treated India as the only rival in Asia which may counteract her hegemonic designs and the sphere of influence in the underdeveloped parts of South and South-East Asia. She wanted to reduce India by hindering her internal developments through maintaining sub-continental instability and encouraging subversive activities in the North-eastern parts of the country. She attempted to tarnish India's image as an independent and non-aligned nation and sandwiched her position as an alliance with US imperialism and Soviet hegemonism.

China, in order to weaken India's security environment, adopted a double-edged policy against her. First, she created an impression about India as involved in super powers grip, hence, her non-alignment has no meaning. Second, that India is enhancing her military power with US and Russian help and therefore she is going to be a potential threat for the integrity and sovereignty of the other smaller nations of the continent. Thus, China wanted to strengthen her Asian image by isolating India and posing to have a position of dominance. Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri on September 20, 1965

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spoke in the Parliament, 'The basic objective of China is to claim for itself a position of dominance in Asia'⁴⁷. And for this purpose People's China applied every possible alternative to undermine the strategic gravity of India. She actively supported Pakistan in 1965 and it was the climax of the hostility when Peking threatened to open a second front against India in the eastern sector to help Pakistan in the Indo-Pak War⁴⁸. She again took up the issue of Kashmir and supported the Pakistani standpoint. In the Parliament on September 20, 1965 Prime Minister Shastri strongly criticised Peking's stand on Kashmir. He said, 'We reject the Chinese claim to tell us anything about what we should do or should not do about Kashmir--'⁴⁹.

Some sign of change in the Chinese attitude was obviously marked in May 1970 when on May Day Chairman Mao-tse-tung spoke to India's Charge d'Affairs and observed that, 'India is a great country; so is China; the two countries have been friendly before and they ought to be friends again....'⁵⁰. But this change in attitude was not followed by any concrete step. India, too, was not in the mood to normalize her relations with Peking perhaps in view of the changing global scenerio. A few Ambassador level talks took place at some capitals.

The process of Sino-US rapprochement had started through Pakistan. Since both the powers, China and America, were apparent supporters of Pakistan on one hand and the crisis in East Pakistan was getting complicated on the other, it was ultimately to result in open Indo-Pak confrontation. Hence, in view of the circumstances leading to Sino-US-Pak collusion and with the object to isolate Pakistan from Chinese link India vigorously reciprocated to the Chinese gesture. This was an obvious security compulsion which pressed India to relax the decade-old tension with China in the early seventies. But the East Pakistan crisis hindered the process and Peking openly sided with Pakistan on the plea that India was fuelling the crisis in the eastern wing with the view to disintegrate Pakistan. Premier Chou in his message of April 11, 1971 assured Peking's firm support to Pakistan's just struggle in case India launched aggression against the latter⁵¹. In the year 1971 three arms agreements were signed between China and Pakistan and according to them Pakistan was to receive MIG-19 fighters, OSA coastal patrol boats and hundred T-59 medium tanks. China expedited the loan to Pakistan worth \$ 70 million and mobilised 10 divisions of the Army along the Indian border on the eastern front.

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The reason of Peking's ignoring and undermining the liberation struggle of East Bengali people was that China treated the uprising in East Pakistan similar to that of Tibet in 1959 when the Tibetan refugees crossed over to India. In the Chinese calculation the uprising in East Pakistan was inspired and instigated by India with the object of dismembering Pakistan and moreover 'they felt that if India was able to establish the Bangla Desh government in Dacca it may alongwith Russia encircle China and eventually try to 'liberate' Tibet for the Dalai Lama'⁵². However, the major irritant factor to the Chinese was the Indo-Soviet treaty to which they treated as 'anti-Chinese alliance'. The Chinese termed it as a collusion between Soviet 'Social imperialists and Indian expansionists'. She accused India of expansionism and the Soviet Union as being her 'back-stage boss'⁵³. The Chinese news agency Hsinhua put a direct blame over the Soviets of conspiring infighting between the Asian nations. On December 23, 1971 it said, 'Soviet revisionist social imperialism was pursuing frenziedly its policy of setting Asians against Asians to realize its 'vicious aim' to control South Asia sub-continent and the Indian Ocean'⁵⁴. Therefore, despite India's willingness, no normalization could be materialized with China and the process was fully obstructed with the calling of Chinese charge d' Affairs Huang Mung-toa to Peking in October 1971.

Admittedly the emergence of Bangla Desh and the total failure of Pakistani military Junta enjoying the exclusive Chinese material and moral support marked the failure of Peking's policy in South Asia. Her diplomacy stood foiled and her strategic calculations about South Asia proved wrong. So in the post-1971 phase China adopted another propaganda instrument to undermine India's Asian prospect. She portrayed her image, by presenting the precedence of Bangla Desh as expansionist power threatening the sovereignty and integrity of smaller nations in the region. This is an obvious fact that since 1965 China used Pakistan as an instrument for her regional policy of military confrontation particularly against India, for 'one of the main aims of China's foreign policy has been to keep India engaged by the Pakistani threat.....'⁵⁵. The failure of Pakistan was ultimately the failure of Peking's inherent interests in South Asia in the face of India and the Soviet Union.

Peking although welcomed the Simla Agreement of June 1972 between India and Pakistan but in the month of August it vetoed the entry of Bangla Desh to the United Nations putting the condition that entry would be only possible when all the prisoners of war are released and the foreign troops are withdrawn from the countries in Asia. This was although indirect but open expression of

Chinese foreign policy that China was not ready to co-operate with India in the sub-continental affairs and furthermore, it indicated that she was indirectly declining from the process of bilateral normalization. The deviation in their approach was due to the fact that the sub-continental setting was quite contrary to their interests. An independent Bangla Desh was not going to serve their strategic interests as erstwhile East Pakistan⁵⁶ - which was a part of Pakistan. The emergence of Bangla Desh was compatible with India's strategic interests since its independent existence was the paramount need for the over all security environment in the sub-continent and still more a significant factor for stability and peace in the region. Thus, there was a clear cut clash of interests between the two nations and prospects for normalization were naturally to be marred.

During the year 1973 too, there loomed only two factors which basically inhibited China from coming closer to India. First, while making any friendly approach to India China could not ignore her years old friendship with Pakistan to which she treated as a permanent mate to help in realizing the strategic interests in South Asia. The second inhibition was Indo-Soviet treaty to which she suspected as 'anti-Peking alliance' establishing Soviet

influence in South Asia undermining the Chinese prospects in the region. 'China considered Russia as its evowed enemy and as such gave the highest priority to the containment of Soviet influence all over the world'⁵⁷. India, on her part, tried best to clarify the effects of the Indo-Soviet treaty. On November 23, 1973 Swaran Singh in the Rajya Sabha put up the clarification about the treaty is not directed against any country'⁵⁸. Further, there happened one incident in the month of May, 1973 which indicated an absolutely non-cooperative stand on the part of Peking towards the friendly gesture with India. This was the re-publication of Premier Chou's letter of November 13, 1962 and it was sent to the Heads of Afro-Asian Nations. This was issued as an indirect direction to India that China might accept the status-quo in the middle and central sectors by recognizing the Mc Mohan line in lieu of the loss of Ak-sai-Chin to India. It is also known that India could never compromise with this condition. In this situation the normalization, therefore, could not have the positive effect.

The People's China, in the year 1974, too, could not deprive herself of the anti-India campaign which, however, hindered the process of bilateral normalization. India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in May 1974 was fanned by Peking as India's measure to threaten and blackmail

smaller nations in the region. India made it abundantly clear that the nuclear explosion at Pokharan was meant to study the prospects of peaceful utilization of atomic energy. The Chinese were not convinced that India conducted the peaceful nuclear explosion and they viewed it in the context of Third World and Super Power relations⁵⁹.

The other obstructing issue in the early 1975 was the merger of Sikkim as there was a revolt against the Chogyal's regime. Peking gave it a colour of expansionist policy of New Delhi which was trying to bully her neighbours. The NCNA said "the Indian Government's action was not democratic..... The constitution was imposed on Sikkim after the Sikkimese People's resistance was battered down by Indian troops and police"⁶⁰. Peking declined to accept Sikkim as a State of Indian Union⁶¹ and strongly condemned India for annexing Sikkim under her expansionist designs. India in clear terms stated that her involvement in Sikkim was per aspirations of the Sikkimese people.

Some significant improvement could be marked in the year 1975. In February a Chinese Table Tennis team headed by Vice-Minister Marshal Chen Hsi-lien came to India as a friendly gesture. The Vice-Minister laid emphasis over the traditional link between the two nations and hoped to restore it again by resolving the outstanding problems.

But Peking was again annoyed over the visit of Soviet Defence Minister Andre Grechko to India in the early March 1975. The NCNA said, 'Marshal Grechko's trip was designed to bring upto-date weapons and equipments to the Indian army to strengthen India's arms production capacity'⁶². Chinese outburst against India could not affect latter's firmness in her attempt of restoring the normalcy. India took the initiative to set up the political relationship through the exchange of Ambassadors.

But this was not all for patching up the 14 years old deteriorated relationship. And, during this gap there had emerged so many other issues, besides the basic ones, which complicated the route to restoration of relations. The resolution of all the issues was not so easy and was a long drawn process. The basic issue before India was the solution of the border problem which needed relaxation in Peking's hard-lining attitude. Not only this Peking's stand on Kashmir and its anti-Indian activities of aiding and abetting the subversive elements such as Nagas, Mizos and Naxalities, all this needed a change to pave the way to permanent friendship.

The construction of Karakoram Highway through India's Aksai-Chin was a major issue involving the important security consideration in the northern sector.

Similarly there were some basic issues too with China which blocked the road to total normalization. She could not extend her friendly hands towards India bypassing the interests of Pakistan with which she was closely linked since last 15 years. The other basic inhibition before her was the Indo-Soviet treaty. She treated Soviet Union as her main rival at global and regional levels. If China was rigid on most of the issues in view of her Asian designs, India, too, was equally preoccupied with her strategic interests in the over all regional environment in South Asia. Therefore, during this phase of 1971 to 1976, despite India's keenness and initiative, no material progress could be made except the formalisation of political relations between the two Asian powers.

THE NEIGHBOURING IMPACT

PAKISTAN

As this has already been discussed in the previous phase that the most disquieting feature in the Indo-Pak relations has been the American policy of arms-buildup in Pakistan since early sixties. 'American military aid to Pakistan from 1954 to 1965 was of the order of 1.5 to 2 billion dollars⁶³. But, despite Pakistan's attempt to augment her military strength by more and more foreign assistance, India on her part, made an attempt to befriend the subcontinental partner through the offers of 'no-war pact'.

on a permanent basis. On August 15, 1968, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi offered a 'no-war-pact' to Pakistan which was turned back with a negative response. President Ayub Khan put forth certain conditions prior to the consideration of the pact. Thus the process of normalisation was outrightly hindered. Pakistan adversely reciprocated India's efforts of normalization by encouraging the subversive activities in the North-eastern part of the country by arming, training and financing Mizo and Naga rebels. India offered the 'no war-pact'⁶⁴ again to Pakistan in January 1969 which also met with the same fate.

Infact, Pakistan was busy with her strategy of gaining military superiority against India through the foreign assistance. Politically she wanted to obtain the favour of foreign powers on the matter of Kashmir. The foreign powers actively interested in the sub-continental affairs during the second half of the sixties were United States, People's China and Soviet Union. The strategic interests of all the three varied. Whereas USA was interested in having a position in Asia to counter the Soviet influence in the region, the People's China took interest in aiding and abetting Pakistan vis-a-vis India-her Asian rival. The Soviet Union seemed interested in aiding Pakistan to undermine the influences of United States and China from that country and by seeking base facility in

Pakistan she wanted to interfere in the Indian Ocean in the face of USA. Thus, facing such a situation in the sub-continent India realized the inherent threat to her security from Pakistan being assisted by three powers.

Therefore, in view of the security need, it became inevitable for India to wean away at least one of the foreign powers which were friendly to Pakistan. India protested the Soviet move of arms supply to Pakistan. India put up the plea that the military equipments received by Pakistan could be used against her. The Soviet Union acceded to India's point and some change was obviously marked in Soviet attitude. It might have been due to the new 'Sino-US-Pak' equation in making, for, 'Pakistan's role now of an intermediary between Washington and Peking brought about a strategic change in its dual relationship with those two capitals'⁶⁵. The USSR assured India about her intentions for not supplying arms⁶⁶ to Pakistan in future.

Pakistan's ultimate strategic object in the year 1971 appeared as of gaining the military superiority in comparison to India and alongwith it she tried to weaken India's political stand on Kashmir to undermine her image in the region. Bhutto started fanning the anti-Indian propaganda and justifying the right of the people of Kashmir.

He termed the Kashmir issue as a 'dispute involving the right of five million Kashmiris to self-determination'⁶⁷. Pakistan intentionally took up to initiate hostile activities against India with a view to fetch material and moral support from China and United States. On January 30, 1971 two Pakistani gun men hijacked an Indian Airlines plane to Lahore. The Pakistani government conditioned the release of the plane with the release of 36 members of Al Fatah who were imprisoned for anti-national activities in Kashmir. As a spontaneous reaction the government of India suspended, with immediate effect, all the overflights of Pakistani civil and military planes over the Indian territory unless the issue of hijacking was satisfactorily resolved. This caused serious resentment in Pakistan and she took up the matter to the Security Council along with complaining the matter to third parties e.g., USA, USSR and Iran.

The mutual differences reached to the boiling point when on March 25, 1971 Pakistan's army crackdown started in East Pakistan to suppress the democratic voice of Sheikh Mujib's Awami League which enjoyed a overwhelming majority and was eligible to form the government. An indiscriminate genocide started and the terror-stricken people in masses started crossing over to India from East Pakistan. The influx

of refugees caused an economic burden over the country on one hand and created a serious security problem on the other. Participating in the discussion on the issue of refugees Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi spoke on the floor of the House on March 26, 1971 that 'It is a problem created by calculated genocide that is resulting not only in the murder of tens of thousands of men, women and children but also forcing many more to seek refuge and shelter in India'⁶⁸. The Indian government giving shelter to refugees was accused by Pakistan of interfering in her internal affairs.

The United States seemed interested in fuelling the situation in the sub-continent. She lifted the embargo on arms supply to Pakistan and resumed the supply. The New York Times on June 22, 1971 reported the shipment of American arms to Pakistan. This helped Pakistani military junta to expedite the suppressive activities in the Eastern wing. Swaran Singh expressed in the Lok Sabha on June 24, 1971 that any addition to Pakistan's military might may prove disastrous to the interests of Bangla Desh people⁶⁹. And apparently as the result, the dropping in of the refugees increased extra pressure over the Indian economy. Besides the economic burden it posed a threat to the national security. Mrs. Gandhi had already clarified in the Lok Sabha on May 26, 1971 that the refugee problem is threatening peace and security⁷⁰ of India as well as of the South-east

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Asian region. Moreover, Pakistani media propagated that India is engaged in an undeclared war⁷¹ against her and is concentrating massive forces to mount the aggression. But the fact stood really its opposite. It was virtually Pakistan which threatened total war against India with the open object of 'Crush India' - 'Conquer India'⁷². Mrs. Gandhi told the Lok Sabha on November 24, 1971 that India lodged 66 protests with Pakistan for committing border violations covering 890 incidents and similarly Pakistani air violations cover 50 incidents for which India had to lodge 17 protests'⁷³.

Therefore, in the context of strategic environment that prevailed due to the Sino-American support to Pakistan and Pakistan's aggressiveness for miscalculated territorial gains, India was compelled to seek an alternate option so as to formulate her foreign policy as per need of the national security. Swaran Singh visited Moscow from 6 to 8 June and discussed with Soviet Leaders in detail the specific problems India was facing. Naturally, this was a spadework for the cultivation of Indo-Soviet affinity. D.P. Dhar's visit to Moscow from 4 to 6 August finalised the shape of the Indo-Soviet friendship which was signed on August 9, 1971 in the form of the 'Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation'. The treaty had strong security overtones⁷⁴, for, it primarily wore a bilateral character.

Undoubtedly, the 1971 episode on the sub-continent in which Pakistan centrally figured, caused a serious concern to India's twenty three years old non-aligned policy. The Sino-US-Pak collusion had put the country's security in danger. Hence, this was a major security compulsion which pushed ahead India's foreign policy towards more interest-oriented dynamism. The twenty years friendship treaty with Soviet Union proved to be a positive approach in structuring a favourable strategic environment in the sub-continent as well as in South Asia and it ultimately helped in safeguarding India's security interests.

The Indo-Pak conflict, ending with the emergence of Bangla Desh as an independent democratic republic, appeared as an immediate strategic gain to India and therefore, in the post-conflict period India made efforts to ensure the recognition of Bangla Desh by Pakistan. The friendly Bangla Desh was deemed to serve India's security interests better than the erstwhile East Pakistan - a territorial part of hostile West Pakistan. The Simla Summit between 28 June to 2 July 1972 was a remarkable attempt in this direction. President Bhutto agreed to respect the position of 17th December 1971 as the actual line of control in Jammu & Kashmir and apart from it he agreed for early recognition of Bangla Desh.

The Simla agreement, however, could not improve the spirit of bilaterlism and the relations between the two, yet remained strained. It was due to the non-cooperative attitude of Pakistan which rooted in her out dated thinking and suspicion about India. In October 1972 Pakistan, through an agreement, managed to receive 6 Sea King-ASW Helicopters worth \$ 12.5 million from Britain. The main obstructions blocking the road to normalization were Pakistan's uncompromising attitude over Kashmir and delay in the recognition of Bangla Desh. The another game which President Bhutto wanted to play as a trick of his skilled diplomacy was to create misunderstanding between India and Bangla Desh by deciding each and every affair with India without bringing the latter into picture. On January 3, 1973, Bhutto expressed his grief that Mrs. Gandhi did not accept his invitation to visit Pakistan to resume the second round of talks to strengthen the spirit of Simla agreement. He alleged that she wanted the recognition of Bangla Desh first. The underhand policy of Bhutto seemed to befriend Bangla Desh on the basis of Muslim fanaticism. On January 3 in a public meeting at Karachi he said 'Now it is for the people of Pakistan to have good relations with Muslim Bengal just as they have with the Muslims of the entire world'⁷⁵.

Regarding the recognition, Pakistan wanted to put a prior condition over Bangla Desh that she should share

the fifty percent of the total debt of Pakistan amounting to Rs.1400 crores. Pakistan further wanted the immediate settlement of the POWs issue exclusively with India without the concurrence of Bangla Desh. But this was not at all practicable.

Another obstruction which discouraged the process of normalization was that Pakistan suffered with the old fobia of threat from stronger India and hence, she attempted to receive huge financial support from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait in order to increase her armoury with a view to achieve parity with India. Pakistan allocated to her defence budget 9% of GNP and 50% of the total national income. This was sufficiently evident of her aggressive designs and forced India to allocate to her defence budget the amount to the tune of Rs.1,77,000 lacs.

Pakistan's otherwise intention ultimately caused its effect over India's foreign relations in view of the security. India, in the course of her close relations with the Soviet Union, sought to ensure massive supply of arms to meet any potential threat in the sub-continent.

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Desh in February 1974. The recognition naturally put away the deadlock obstructing the path of normalization. India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh signed a tripartite agreement on April 9, 1974 to settle the matter of 195 Pakistani POWs.

India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in May 1974 caused considerable resentment in Bhutto's mind who propagated it as a threatening measure of India against Pakistan. He fanned it as India's strategy of domination in the sub-continent and ruled out the possibility of a 'no-war pact' between India and Pakistan. He publicised the matter with the object to create world opinion against India as having aggressive designs for Pakistan. His main purpose was to earn the American sympathy to that extent which could mobilize the US administration for resuming the arms supply to Pakistan to stabilize the power-balance in the sub-continent as well as in South Asia.

Bhutto's plea about India's expansionist intention was further strengthened with the merger of Sikkim into India in January 1975. Ultimately Bhutto well succeeded in his diplomacy to persuade United States to lift the ban on arms supply to Pakistan. India's peaceful nuclear explosion and Sikkim's merger were the instances which were sufficient enough to substantiate Bhutto's claim for US reinforcement for self-defence. The US State Department announced the

lift of Arms Embargo on February 24, 1975. Mr. T.N. Kaul, India's Ambassador to United States issued a statement strongly opposing the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan. 'Our differences with Pakistan', he said, 'are temporary and can and will be solved bilaterally and peacefully if there is no outside intervention'⁷⁶.

The US decision again initiated the arms race in the sub-continent. The policy of power-balance was revived which kept apart India and Pakistan in the sixties and early seventies and it definitely impeded the process of normalization in the second half of the seventies which was positively deemed to materialize in the spirit of Simla. Besides, Pakistan received huge military assistance from China during the year 1975 which included medium range bombers, destroyers and patrol boats. This made Pakistan the largest non-communist recipient of Chinese military aid and considerably added to her air and naval strength.

This amply demonstrated Pakistan's strategy of gaining military superiority in the sub-continent through external military assistance. India, despite her attempt to improve the bilateral relations in the spirit of Simla Agreement, failed to bring stability in the sub-continent.

On the reverse Pakistan's military designs caused a grave concern to the Indian national security. Mrs. Gandhi visited USSR in June 1976 to strengthen India's ties with that country. 'India turned to the Soviet Union to fill a gap which the US and its allies were unwilling to bridge'⁷⁷. The Sino-US anti-Soviet designs in the sub-continent proped up Pakistani hostility towards India. Their interest to exert influence in the region in the face of Soviet Union encouraged arms race and resulted in potential threat to India's security. Thus, in view of the broader security interests, India was ultimately bound to cement her existing ties with USSR. The bilateral friendship in face added much, industrially, technologically and militarily, to the overall defence capability of the nation.

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4. Lok Sabha Debates, Fourth series, Vol. XLV, November 9 to 23, 1970, Col. 200.
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8. 'So-preoccupied was he with his China initiative - the international significance and potentiality of which he highly overrated - that he could neither see, nor appreciate the heavy burden and relentless compulsion under which India found itself during the second half of 1971'. Mudhu Limye, Problems of India's foreign Policy(New Delhi, 1984), p. 118.
9. V.P. Dutta, India's Foreign Policy(New Delhi,1984),p.81.
10. The Hindustan Times, 1 December, 1971.
11. Ibid, 2 December, 1971.
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13. S.R. Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy : Annual Survey 1971, p. 270.
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15. The American Journalist Anderson mentioned four reasons behind the despatching of 'Enterprises' to the Bay of Bengal. 'One to compel India to divert both ship and planes to shadow the task force; two, to weaken India's blockade of East Pakistani ports; three, to divert the Indian aircraft carrier, Vikrant from its military missions; and four, to force India to keep planes on defence alert thus reducing their offensive operations against Pakistani ground forces, S.R.Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy Annual 1971, p.170.

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16. S.R. Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy : Annual Survey 1971, p. 175.
17. The Statesman, 10 February, 1972.
18. Ibid.
19. The Times of India, 13 August, 1972.
20. The Lok Sabha Debates, Fifth series, Vol.XXIV, No. 17, March 13, 1973, Col. 178 - 'They (Joseph Sisco) have developed now another strange theory. They want to develop the defence capacity of Pakistan because they want to ensure integrity of Pakistan for that reason they want to develop the deterrent strength of Pakistan. But, against whom ? Naturally against India, '---Samar Guha.
21. Ibid. Col. 180
22. Ibid, Cols. 183-184- On the question of US Arms supply to Pakistan Mr. Paul Wirkke then Assistant Secretary for International Affairs said in 1971 before the House Committee of foreign Affairs, 'Our business is to use the military sales and grant programmes to implement the policy of the United States. We are not in the business of selling arms or providing arms just for sake of providing arms'.

23. The Lok Sabha Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. XXXVI, No. 12, March 6, 1974, Col. 238.
24. Ibid, Col. 239.
25. The Lok Sabha Debates, fifth Series, Vol. XXXVI, No. 15, March 12, 1974, Col. 173.
26. 'Such great talent of resources has been squandered on the vanity of power while 600 million Indians slip deeper into poverty' - The New York Times comment reproduced in the Times of India, 22 May, 1974.
27. 'The US policy was to discourage nuclear proliferation and suggested that policy applied to India also' - Thomas Shoemith, the American Charge d'Affairs, see the Indian Express, 24 May, 1974.
28. 'I think that the development, the spread of nuclear weapons, is potentially devastating' - James Schlesinger, The Indian Express, 24 May, 1974.
29. Bimal Prasad, India's Foreign Policy : Studies in Continuity and Change(New Delhi; 1979) p. 385.
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31. The US spokesman Robert Anderson said, 'I should emphasize that this is a 'cash only' policy....We are not planning to provide any equipment on a great military assistance basis or on credit'. The Times of India, 26 February, 1975.
32. The Hindustan Times, 27 February 1975.
33. President Gerald Ford said 'I think it is a very sad development and I hope that in time there could be a restoration of democratic processes as we know them in the United States', The Indian Express, 18 September, 1975.
34. S.R. Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy : Annual Survey 1971, p. 129.
35. The Lok Sabha Debates, Fifth series, Vol. VII, No. 56, 9 August, 1971, Col. 252.
36. Ibid, Col. 253.
37. Ibid - The Foreign Minister in Lok Sabha said on August 9, 1971 'This should act as deterrent to any powers that may have aggressive designs on our territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is, therefore, in essence a treaty of Peace against War'.

38. Madhu Limya, Problems of India's Foreign Policy, p.120.
39. The New York Times (Editorial), 10 August 1971, commented that it 'strengthens the Soviet influence in the second most populous nation in Asia-and the world at the expense of the United States'. It further said this decision 'was influenced by apprehension in both capitals about the growing rapprochement between the United States and China', N.M. Ghatate, Indo-Soviet Treaty : Reactions and Reflections (New Delhi, 1972), p. 173.
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- * 'The dangers that India and Russia want to guard against are limited and easily defined and the new alignment can be expected to tell where it is meant to tell', N.M. Ghatate, Indo-Soviet Treaty: Reactions and Reflections, p. 182.

41. The Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. VII, No. 56, Col. 253 -
The foreign Minister said, 'We sincerely hope that the policy of non-alignment will be further strengthened and will become an effective instrument for the safeguarding of our national interests and will be an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world'.
42. V.P. Dutta, India's Foreign Policy, P. 120.
43. The Motherland, 1 December, 1973.
44. S.R. Sharma, Indian Foreign Policy : Annual Survey 1973 (New Delhi, 1977) pp. 189 - 190.
45. 25th CPSU Congress; Documents and Resolutions - (New Delhi, 1976) PP. 12-13, Brezhnev said 'Our countries have concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and co-operation. And even this short period has clearly shown the tremendous significance of our bilateral ties and its role as a stabilising factor in South Asia and the continent as a whole.... The Soviet people appreciate, and more, are in solidarity with India's peace loving foreign policy and the courageous effort of her progressive forces to solve her difficult socio-economic problems'.

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53. V.P. Dutta, India's Foreign Policy, p. 216.
54. The Times of India, 25 December, 1971. The Hsinhua alleged that Soviet Union was instigating India for her expansionist ambitions. It said 'making use of the expansionist ambition for a greater Indian empire, the Soviets instigated the Indian reactionaries to set them against other Asian countries and create tension incessantly'.

55. S.R. Sharma, Bangla Desh Crisis and Indian foreign Policy, p. 237.
56. Ibid, pp. 372 - 373. China's strategic interest in East Bengal was simple. It wanted an East Pakistan unfriendly to India.... The Chinese assumption was that so long as East Bengal was part of Pakistan it would remain anti-India which was in China's interest. But the emergence of an independent Bangla Desh with the help of India was bound to be pro-India and this is what the Chinese considered as against their national interest'.
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60. The Indian Express, 16 July, 1974.
61. The Indian Express, 12 September, 1974, China said on 11 September that 'it absolutely does not recognize India's move to give Sikkim the status of an associate State'.
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64. Ibid. Col. 199 - India's Defence Minister Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabha, 'As the House is aware, India has apart from signing the Tashkent Declaration, made repeated offers of 'no-war-pact' to Pakistan and has taken several initiatives for normalizing relations with her'.
65. V.P. Dutta, India's Foreign Policy, p. 152.
66. The Lok Sabha Debates, Fourth series, Vol. XLV, November 9 to 23, 1970 Col. 200 - Swaran Singh informed the Lok Sabha that 'we are glad that the Soviet Government have given consideration to our representations and informed us that they have not supplied and do not intend to supply any military hardware in addition to that already supplied in the past'.
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CHAPTER - SIX

FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY COMPULSIONS 1977 - 80

THE JANTA REGIME

The Indian politics underwent a historic change in March 1977. Janta Party, a political-mix of all the main opposition factions except the communists, was voted to power as an alternative to the Congress which had dominated the political scene of the country for thirty years. The basic issues responsible for the change were exclusively internal. The foreign policy issue did not play even a slender role in the political upheaval of India, unlike other democracies, particularly the United States - the biggest democracy in the world, where the external affairs play an important role in retaining or changing the Government in power.

However, the apprehensions, that the Janta Government would bring major changes in the basic frame-work of India's foreign policy, existed till the time the new government announced her obvious stand about the external policy. It was because some main constituent factions, such as Jan Sangh and Swatantra Party, have always been criticizing the course of Congress foreign policy alongwith its stand on the nuclear option. Throughout the Congress regime till 1977,

Atal Behari Bajpai, the Jan Sangh leader has been the chief spokesmen of his party who frequently used to speak over the foreign affairs and criticize the external policy. The Congress government's pro-Soviet tilt, starting since second half of the sixties, became the underlying aspect of criticism for almost every opposition party except the leftists. On this basis, further, it was feared that the Peace Treaty of August 1971 with Soviet Union strengthening Indo-Soviet relations, may be over looked and a new equation may be sought with the United States due to the right wing pressure in the Janta Government.

But just after assuming the office, Janta Party announced its commitment to 'proper' or 'genuine' non-alignment as country's foreign policy. The External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Bajpai expressed in the Lok Sabha on June 22, 1977, 'The policy of non-alignment is infact a logical and essential extension of the national independence in the field of international affairs..... We cherish our national independence but reject the need to consign national defence to a committed or dependent military or ideological arrangement'¹. The emphasis over the 'genuine non-alignment' denoted that India should remain non aligned in the real practice without making commitment to any military alliance or entering into special treaty relationship with any nation or a group of nations. Thus, even after an interlude of three

decades, when the pattern of political power in India met with a significant change, the basic postulates of foreign policy remained unchanged. The new government, a multi-ideological forum, adhered to the policy of non-alignment in the true letter and spirit.

THE GLOBAL IMPACT

THE UNITED STATES

The installation of the new government at New Delhi in March 1977 was warmly appreciated by Washington. The US administration overtly appreciated the Janta Party coming to power as it was the restoration of democracy. The imposition of emergency was widely criticized by the American news media. The emergency was believed as the starting of 'totalitarian' rule by Mrs. Indira Gandhi with a view to weaken the institution of democracy in India for sustaining herself in power. The covert reason was that new perspectives of building up close relations with India were realized since the new government was committed to 'friendship with all' through the policy of 'genuine-non-alignment'. There stood one more reason for this optimism. The Janta Party was supposed to have some rightists and semi-rightist forces which were expected to support right-prone policy in the place of Mrs. Gandhi's left-oriented outlook

favouring Soviet Union. Further, holding of the Foreign Office by Atal Behari Bajpai belonging to the erstwhile Jan Sangh - an ultra-rightist-cum-nationalist wing in Indian politics, certainly added more to US optimism. Bajpai usually held the view that India's relations with the Socialist countries did not form any impediment in the course of improving relations with the United States². Thus, it was undoubtedly perceived in America that the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 would not come in the way of improving Indo-US relations.

The Carter administration hailed the Janta Government through the messages of cordiality and goodwill. Warren Christopher, the US Deputy Secretary of State came to India on July 23, 1977 on a goodwill visit. Wide ranging talks took place between Christopher and Bajpai which included bilateral economic aid, IDA assistance through World Bank, improvement of trade through tariff relaxation and Indian Ocean. Honouring the US Deputy Secretary on July 23, Indian External Affairs Minister, Bajpai said, 'We believe that new American Administration has also given up some old tilts and prejudices. In the leadership of President Carter.. we see a new hand of friendship extended on the basis of shared ideals and faith in our political system'³. Christopher's visit to India, in unmistakable terms, opened new vistas for improving bilateral relations.

The disruption in the supply of enriched uranium for 400-Megawatt reactor at Tarapur caused resentment in India. The United States was under obligation to supply enriched uranium to India during a period of 30 years under the provisions of 1963 - Tarapur Agreement. However, the visit of US Under Secretary of State for Security, Science and Technology Joseph Nye in August 1977 removed the hurdle for supply to Tarapur. He said to consider the supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur Plant. Now the atmosphere of goodwill was created between the two nations and the process of improving bilateral relationship was going on faster.

The visit of US dignitaries to India was soon reciprocated by Bajpai's visit to the United States in September - October, 1977. He led the Indian Delegation to attend the 22nd United Nations General Assembly Session. On September 30 Bajpai addressed the Council for Foreign Relations in New York on the subject 'The Democratic and Social Revolution in India and Foreign Policy'. He upheld the importance of democracy since 'it derives its sanction from the consent and judgment'⁴ of the people. He presented a similarity in the 'idealism' and 'inspiration' of President Carter and Late President Kennedy and expected better from Carter's forthcoming visit to India⁵. On October 5 President Carter hosted a dinner to the visiting

Foreign Ministers of Asian nations. On this occasion Bajpai availed the opportunity of exchanging his views with President Carter and the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

President Carter's visit to India was very ardently being awaited as it was hoped to result in much positive outcomes. He came to India on January 1, 1978 and was accorded a red carpet welcome. President Jimmy Carter was, indeed, seen quite sentimental in expressing his appreciation to the Government and the People of India. It appeared that the most impressing thing to Carter in India was democratic sense of the masses who, for the sake of saving democracy, voted 30 years old Congress government out of power. But the sentiment and diplomacy do not work together. Carter, too, could not be an exception to it. He could not afford to drift apart from the basic theme of American diplomacy. Ofcourse this was natural also. Carter had to keep himself in line with the pulls and pressures of the domestic politics. It may, therefore, be assumed that Carter's visit to India was basically aimed at persuading Indian leadership for accepting international inspection of all the nuclear installations but Desai, however, did not yield to it⁶. On the question of signing Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Desai observed 'The Non-proliferation Treaty has not been signed by us although both the Soviet Union and the United States of America wanted that we should sign it and

they have been applying pressure on this country for the last few years.....They are not giving up atomic weapons. And yet, they are asking other people to sign⁷. Thus the difference between the two on the non-proliferation issue remained unresolved⁸.

Further, Carter's behaviour in India was openly recorded of having favour with Pakistan. He objected India's efforts for buying deep-penetration aircrafts but, at the same time justified the supply of arms to Pakistan as it was in US global interest. At the same time US desired to maintain the balance of power in the sub-continent. This in turn, in various ways, harmed the security interests of India. Regarding Indian Ocean the Carter Administration adopted a satisfactory approach. President Carter admitted that the littoral states also had a stake in the Indian Ocean and initiated negotiations with the Soviet Union to contain militarization⁹. Thus, it can be analyzed that the basic differences continued over the US arms policy to Pakistan, the NPT and the issue of full scope nuclear safeguard.

Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited USA in June 1978. Although this visit is assessed to have established rapport between the two nations but the underlying issues causing primary obstruction for closer ties remained yet unresolved. Since the issue of nuclear

non-proliferation remained unresolved the supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur met with a state of unending uncertainty. The Janta Government refused to accept the precedence of PNE-May 1974, yet, it obstructed the US foreign policy¹⁰ decisions on the nuclear issues. 'The United States maintain that at present no distinction can be made between a nuclear explosion made for peaceful purposes and a nuclear explosion made for military purposes'¹¹. This was, therefore, a security compulsion before India which forced her to decline from accepting the full scope nuclear safeguards at the cost of uranium for Tarapur Plant. India did not agree with the US proposal to close down her nuclear options. After returning from Washington Prime Minister Morarji Desai observed in the Lok Sabha that 'The nuclear issue is no doubt an important point of difference between the two countries'¹².

The US Indian Ocean policy became a factor of serious security concern to India and therefore, caused a deadlock in the process of forming closer bilateral relations. By March 1979 the Carter administration had finally concluded to intensify its naval presence in the Gulf as well as in the Indian Ocean. The administration decided to secure the Gulf from Iraq in the North to Oman in the South for ensuring the uninterrupted oil shipment to America and Western Europe. In this context the militarization of Indian Ocean was viewed as a part of American

global policy. As a result 100000 troops in combat readiness were proposed to be deployed in the Gulf. Indian reaction to this move was expressed by the External Affairs Minister thus, 'committed as we are to keep Indian Ocean free from naval presence and rivalry of great powers, we are distressed at this announcement. This is contrary to the spirit of the UK resolution on keeping the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace'¹³.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 provided the United States with an open pretext to restructure her position in the sub-continent in particular and the South Asia in general. She decided to re-inforce her naval strength in Indian Ocean and also to arm Pakistan for supporting the Afghan rebels. In US calculations the Soviet occupied Afghanistan might threaten Iran and Pakistan and adversely affect her oil interests in the Gulf. The Carter administration, therefore, lifted the ban which was put under Symington Amendment in April 1979 on arms supply to Pakistan and immediately decided to supply arms worth \$ 150 million to Pakistan. Further on January 13, 1980, President Carter announced the tentative approval of \$ 400 million military and economic aid to Pakistan - half of the aid was exclusively for military purposes. Pakistan seemed to be dissatisfied with this aid. Zia-ul-Haq, naming it as 'Peanuts' asked for aid worth \$ 5 billion to build up defences against Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the

'traditional adversary'¹⁴ India. Not only this Pakistan is reported to have insisted the United States for making a new military treaty to replace the defence agreement of 1959¹⁵ Evidently the 'supply of arms to Pakistan in the past had invariably led to the increased tension in South Asia and resulted in armed conflicts in the sub-continent'¹⁶ and therefore the American decision of arms shipment to Pakistan appeared as a serious security compulsion before India which obstructed the road to closer Indo-US relations.

THE USSR

The Janta Party coming to Power in March 1977 naturally caused some apprehension to Moscow regarding the future structure of New Delhi's foreign policy. It was perhaps because of the right wing domination in the foreign affairs of the country. The Janta Government's assertion to follow the policy of 'genuine non-alignment' added more to the Soviet apprehension, for, the 'genuine non-alignment'¹⁷ was normally interpreted in terms of 'balanced relationship'. The diplomatic circles in the West interpreted Desai's emphasis over not having special relationship with any country as 'a shift in Indo-Soviet relations' which had reached to an unexpected height in the period of Mrs. Indira Gandhi.¹⁸ But in India's foreign policy calculations the existing relationship with the Soviet Union, was however,

not to be undermined. More than two decades old friendship with that country corresponding to politico-military support as well as multi-dimensional economic co-operation was not so easy to be ignored by a new government which, a few months earlier, resumed the office. Even, India's Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Bajpai, stalwart of erstwhile Jant Sangh which remained a point of severe criticism by the Russian media till 1977, hailed the Soviet material and moral support to India from time to time¹⁹.

Despite the fact that similarity in approach and outlook had been the basis of Indo-Soviet friendship in the past years yet the mutuality in strategic considerations too played an important role in strengthening the bilateral relationship.

Prime Minister Desai in an interview with Soviet Television said 'we have very happy relations with the Soviet Union ever since we got our freedom and I hope that they will continue to be happy and become better and better as years go by'²⁰. He emphasized over the need of strengthening India's relations with the Soviet Union as they 'were consistent to the policy of non-alignment'²¹. The same degree of reciprocity is seen in Soviet attitude for maintaining the depth in bilateral relations. On August 14, 1977 at New Delhi the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister,

N.P. Mirubin emphasized over the effectiveness of bilateral co-operation in international affairs as an important factor in consolidating the regional as well as global security and peace²².

Thus, it is evident that both the nations, in view of their respective strategic interests, felt the need to continue and strengthen their mutual relations. So far India is concerned she could not afford to ignore the threat to her security from Pakistan which was being actively supported by the United States and China. The Janta Government too, was obsessed with the threat perception from Pakistan and, therefore, being preoccupied with the security compulsion, decided to continue the existing relations with the USSR which had already taken a deep root in the regime of Mrs. Gandhi. For solidifying the bilateral ties a protocol between them was signed at New Delhi on September 2, 1977 for strengthening collaboration in the field of ferrus metallurgy and allied technology²³. The Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin assured Desai that Soviet policy towards India was based on larger mutual interests²⁴.

Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited USSR from October 21 to 26, 1977. Speaking at the banquet in Kremlin Desai said that the basis of Indo-Soviet ties was

'equality, national interest and enlightened common purpose'²⁵. On November 14 giving a statement about his visit in the Lok Sabha Desai said 'I would like to state that this visit confirms the essential continuity of India's relationship with the Soviet Union.... The visit has, infact, given a dimension of stability and strength to Indo-Soviet relationship'²⁶.

The Soviet interest in India, other than that of having a counter-balancing position vis-a-vis US influence in Asia, was to undermine the Chinese impact in the region which was growing in collusion with the United States and Pakistan. This may be one of the substantial observations that Russian politico-military as well as economic support to India was to strengthen her position in the continent in the face of Pakistan supported by China since early sixties²⁷.

The Soviet Prime Minister A. Kosygin visited India in March 1979 just about a month after Bajpai's visit to China. His 'main objective was to win over India to the Soviet stand on South East Asia, in particular Vietnam'²⁸. He made his best efforts to persuade Prime Minister Desai to recognize Kampuchea. He warned India about Chinese designs but he could not succeed²⁹. However, India condemned Chinese aggression in Vietnam but made her stand clear to

Kosygin that she wanted the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops first from Kampuchea.

Regarding Vietnam there was one more point of difference between them. Kosygin, in view of Deng Xiaoping's visit to USA, held that China was encouraged by the United States in her Vietnam adventure but Prime Minister Desai's stand was just opposite to it.

But these differences of opinion, however, could not affect the continuity of bilateral relations since they were linked with the mutuality of strategic interests of both the nations. In the end of visit it was concluded that 'Indo-Soviet friendship had stood the test of time and continued to serve as an important factor for peace and stability in Asia and in the whole world'³⁰. Various international problems were discussed and both sides reaffirmed their 'determination to continue joint and active efforts bilaterally and in international forums towards the strengthening of international peace and security'³¹. They reiterated their 'firm support to convert the Indian Ocean into a Zone of peace'³². The non-aligned movement was recognized as a positive factor in international relations for the maintenance of global peace³³. The two sides noted with satisfaction that the visit 'contributed greatly to the development and strengthening of Indo-Soviet friendship and around co-operation'³⁴. Prime Minister

Desai and Kosygin signed a long term programme of co-operation for 10 - 15 years in the field of trade, science and technology.

The External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Bajpai said that despite the differing attitude in Kampuchea 'the relations between the two countries have grown strong and we have been able to attain new values and new heights'³⁵. Kosygin's visit to New Delhi, however, confirmed the continuation of bilateral relations in accordance with the norms as well as the spirit of Friendship treaty of 1971.

Some diverseness in attitude was marked again in December 1979 when Russian forces entered Afghanistan resulting in the installation of pro-Soviet government headed by Barbak Karmal by toppling Hafizulla Amin's Government. Reacting over the incident an External Affairs Ministry spokesman said, 'The Government of India's attitude to such situations is well known. India has always opposed outside interference in the internal affairs of a country by another'³⁶. On December 27 the Soviet Ambassador to India, Y. Vorontsov conveyed to the Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathey a message from Moscow that 'At the request of the Afghan leadership, the Soviet troops have been sent to Afghanistan to enable it to resist external aggression and interference'³⁷. Thus the account of Janta Government's Soviet policy reveals that the Indo-Soviet friendship more

or less grew on the basis of the Friendship Treaty of 1971 but this growth was not beyond the model of non-alignment.

Russian action in Afghanistan was in pursuance of her strategic objective to check American influence in that country in view of growing US-Pak rapport. The Soviet Union, therefore, justified her stand and continued her presence in Afghanistan. But in India's strategic calculations the situation was to cause otherwise effect which might prove detrimental to her security interests in the region. It was calculated that Soviet presence in Afghanistan might prove to be a good ground for Pakistan to fetch more and more military assistance from America with the pretext to check Russian expansionism. On April 3, 1980 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that to India, however, 'any escalation will be a major danger'³⁸.

Since the Afghanistan issue was straightway related with the India's security arrangements, her basic interest lied in the immediate solution of the situation in Afghanistan. Mrs. Gandhi speaking at the Indian Institute of Mass Communication said, 'The situation in Afghanistan should be viewed in the context of the United States and China getting closer'³⁹. This too was a security compulsion which forced India for asking a political settlement of the problem in

Afghanistan. Regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan the External Affairs Minister observed that 'any talk about the withdrawal of forces without furnishing of complete and reliable guarantees of an end to interference in Afghanistan and without an end of actual interference would merely hinder the achievement of a solution'⁴⁰. India's policy position, no doubt, caused some displeasure to Moscow. Vorontsov, the Soviet Ambassador to India, is reported to have gone to the extent in response to India's reaction that he referred India's action in Bangla Desh in 1971 in comparison to that of Russia in Afghanistan⁴¹. But New Delhi, due to the security compulsion, could not modify her foreign policy on the issue of Afghanistan. However, the Soviet Union showed her willingness to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan just after a political settlement was reached⁴².

The Afghanistan issue virtually, did not impede the process of improving Indo-Soviet relations because the Soviet Union, too, was afraid of being encircled⁴³ in Afghanistan by the Sino-US-Pak cactus. The Soviet Union, therefore, could not afford to undermine the strategic relevance of India's friendship in the region. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko visited India in mid of the February 1980 to resolve the differences in appreciation

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of the situation in Afghanistan. The joint statement issued at the end of Gromyko's three-day visit here said, 'the developments in the region and around it were reviewed in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cordiality'⁴⁴.

In Moscow on February 18 Gromyko expressed 'good prospects to strengthen bilateral relations on the basis of 1971 - Peace Treaty for the sake of consolidating peace in Asia as well as in the world'⁴⁵.

The apprehension regarding the US involvement in the region through Pakistan due to the situation arising out of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan compelled India and USSR further to strengthen their ties in view of their broader security interests. The Soviet Union 'favourably considered India's defence requirements in the context of the development in the region'⁴⁶ and an Agreement was signed between them on May 27 in Moscow under which India was to receive defence equipment for Army, Navy and Air Force worth Rs.1300 crores⁴⁷. India's External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narsimha Rao visited Moscow in the first week of June 1980 for holding wide ranging discussions in ~~min~~ over the developments in Afghanistan.

PEOPLE'S CHINA

The post-Mao China seemed to be interested in normalizing her relations with India. Chinese Deputy Premier Li-Hsien-nien talking to a group of American journalists on September 15, 1977 at Washington expressed his country's desire to resolve the old border dispute with India⁴⁸. According to Li the area in dispute in the east is 90,000 sq. kms., in the middle 200 sq. kms. and in the West 33,000 sq. kms.⁴⁹.

This is also worth mention that in the foreign policy statement delivered at the UN General Assembly China made no critical references to India or India's relations with other countries in the sub-continent⁵⁰. On February 4, 1978 at Kathmandu the Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping said, 'As far as China is concerned, we are eager to bring relations between the two countries closer'⁵¹.

China's willingness to normalize relations with India indicated a new approach in Chinese foreign policy practice. China's main object, as it appeared, was to win India in her favour against USSR. She wanted to improve relations with India, 'hoping thereby to reduce India's need for psychological security against China's

enmity and secure a better balance in the India-China-USSR triangle'.¹² So with the course of time and development of events India, too, thought it proper to prepare an environment of mutual understanding with the People's China. Moreover, in view of India's strategic environment related to China the Janta Government realized the necessity of normalizing bilateral relations.

The growing Sino-Pak collusion during the second half of the eighties posed direct threat to India's security. Moreover, 800 Kilometres long Karakoram Highway linking the Chinese road system in Sinkiang and Indus Valley road network of Pakistan - an all weather road between the two nations was completed. There were several factors too, which grossly affected the strategic interests of India, e.g. Chinese stand on Kashmir supporting the right of self-determination there, her unwillingness to recognize Sikkim as an Indian State and her moral and material support to Naga and Mizo rebels. Besides all this the other important factor was Chinese interest in sharing the common object with United States to aid and abet Pakistan vis-a-vis India to operate the balance of power in the region. All these factors indicated China's direct and serious involvement in India's security environment and it was to be

neutralized only through the normalization of bilateral relations. Hence, this was a relevant security compulsion before the Janta Government to resume the process of normalization with that country.

Prime Minister Morarji Desai during his talks with President Carter at Washington on June 17, 1978 reviewed the Sino-Indian relations and noted the recent improvements therein⁵³. In China's trends and attitudes also a positivity in approach was marked at this juncture. An Indian Journalist Mr. K.K. Malkawi after return from a trip to China expressed his impression that 'China was willing to settle the border issue and there was a definite change in its attitude now'⁵⁴. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Hua Kuo Feng assured Jaipal, India's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, that China is keen on improving relations with India and that she appreciates India's efforts in improving relations with the neighbouring countries. He emphasized Chinese keenness in the preservation of peace and stability in the region⁵⁵.

But Chinese behaviour did not coincide with their official statements and the conclusion was bound to be there that Chinese propaganda for normalization of relations with India was far from getting the practical expression. Along

with her friendship propaganda China was equally engaged in subversive activities against India. In the first week of August it came to light that China was actively engaged in training the insurgents who were creating disturbances in the North-eastern states. Replying to a short notice on the Manipur disturbances Prime Minister Desai told the Lok Sabha on August 9, 1978 that 'China would be told to desist from training insurgents from North-east India'⁵⁶.

Similarly regarding the long-pending border problem the Chinese vocal behaviour clearly indicated that they want to linger it on and even if they are really willing for normalization they want it through the resumption of cultural as well as commercial relations. The Chinese Vice-Premier Teng-Hsiao-Ping said that China was 'eager' to have closer relations with India. 'But on matters of bilateral relations, it requires the efforts of two sides'⁵⁷. In his political report to the Fifth National Peoples Congress (NPC) Chairman Hua-Kuo-feng said, 'There are questions pending between China and India. Nevertheless relations can be further improved provided serious efforts are made on both sides'⁵⁸. On the basis of their statements and talks with Indian officials and journalists it could be assessed that the Chinese seemed willing for the resumption of normal relations with India in every field leaving the border problem in

stalemate. Even if they wanted to solve it they wanted it through a new approach which includes 'the drawing of a new border line with appropriate adjustments'⁵⁹.

The Chinese basic strategic interest behind their willingness for normalization of relations with India appeared to undermine the Soviet influence in the sub-continent. They wanted ties with India not in that proportion in which they maintained with Pakistan and they did not want to lessen the priority given to her. The Chinese Vice Premier Keng Piao, replying to a civic reception at Karachi on June 20, said that China wanted to see a 'strong, united and prosperous' Pakistan. He reiterated his country's support to the latter on Kashmir issue also⁶⁰.

So far as the border issue is concerned, obviously, the Chinese wanted to see it aside from the process of normalization. But India's approach was, however, different. For India the settlement of the border issue was an essential condition for normalizing the bilateral relations. Prime Minister Morarji Desai and External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Bajpai were of the view that no normalization could be completed without settling the border dispute⁶¹. Prime Minister Desai, in response to a calling attention motion about his talks with the leader of the Chinese delegation Wang Pin-nan, stated in the Lok Sabha on March 16, 1978, 'I also

made it clear that full normalization of relations, of course, cannot be attained till the main outstanding issue - the border question is resolved to our mutual satisfaction by negotiations and peaceful means'⁶². On his part Wang-Pin-nan agreed in principle to the desirability of the border settlement through peaceful means, yet, no further discussions were held in that concern.

The settlement of boundary dispute has been the basic factor in the process of the normalization of bilateral relations. But practically no initiative was taken by the Chinese Government. It seems that the Chinese wanted India to take initiative regarding the border issue. The Vice President of the National Peoples Congress Ulan Fu, while talking to a visiting Indian Press Delegation, said, that the border problems 'will have to be solved and it will be solved..... If India has any views we would like to discuss them'⁶³. Similarly the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua, during his talks with Atal Behari Bajpai at New York, suggested that 'India should make specific proposals to resolve the Sino-Indian border dispute'⁶⁴.

Thus, taking into account the whole theme since March 1977 related to the Sino-Indian official level dialogues it can be concluded that no solid steps were taken up by the Chinese to resolve the long pending border dispute. Despite

India's attempts to expedite the process of normalization through settling the underlying bilateral problems the Chinese Government obviously avoided to discuss them.

It seems that China wanted to keep the border issue alive so that to use it as a pretext to interfere in the sub-continental affairs as she practised during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. She was very much expected to repeat that practice in December 1971 during the Bangla Desh crisis. But the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1971 worked as a political check to curb any Chinese direct involvement in the sub-continent. So it appears that in Chinese calculation the border issue, if settled ' will cease to be a source of political gambits'⁶⁵.

There may be one more assessment in this concern. Since China treated USSR as her main rival she watched the Russian activities with greater suspicion. Commenting over a Soviet Naval manoeuvre the Chinese official agency Hsinhua said, 'It is a vital move towards the gradual completion of an overall war posture.... this would facilitate its move to the West to consolidate with its gains in West Asia and Africa, and so place under its control the passages from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean around the Cape of Good Hope'⁶⁶. This,

therefore, appears virtually a part of China's global strategy that she, being afraid of growing Soviet influence in South Asia, tried to wean India away from Russian circle. And for that very purpose China waged a propaganda of normalizing her formal relations with India pushing the border issue quite in the back.

During the Janta regime there reflected once again a hope of positive approach towards the solution of border problem when India's External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Bajpai made a visit to China in mid of the February 1979. Giving an account of his China's visit on February 21, Bajpai said in the Lok Sabha that he made aware to the Chinese leadership that the Government and people of India attach fundamental importance to a satisfactory solution of border problem⁶⁷ and its satisfactory solution is a must for establishing relations of mutual confidence between India and China⁶⁸.

But the bilateral dialogues expected to result in normalization were suddenly obstructed following the Chinese attack over Vietnam on February 17, 1979. The External Affairs Minister said in the Parliament on February 21, 1979 'It is a matter of regret that in the course of our frank exchanges,....., the Chinese leaders did not

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inform me of the possibility of developments on the China-Vietnam border⁶⁹. Bajpai accepted that 'the Sino-Indian dialogue has suffered a serious set-back even before it has gathered the necessary momentum for carrying forward the process of normalization'⁷⁰

Hence, it would not be an exaggeration of the fact if it is established that the Chinese leadership intentionally avoided any serious discussion regarding the boundary dispute with Bajpai by disrupting the process of normalization through the pretext of conflict with Vietnam. In fact, China wanted the resumption of better relations with India without touching the border issues. The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Ying, while talking with an Indian Journalist said, 'China has all along maintained that the boundary question should be settled through negotiations. But if conditions are not ripe we can put it aside and look forward to improving relations'⁷¹.

The bilateral initiatives since March 1977, denote that except the opening of the friendly channels no substantial relationship could be established between India and China. The reason was the divergence of interest and approach in forming up the relationship by the two nations. The Peoples China seemed to normalize relations with India with the basic object to undermine the Soviet

influence in the South Asian region. This was a part of her broader expansionist design in the Asian continent. China, therefore, wanted to formalise the relationship with India leaving the boundary issue in the unsettled state.

India, in view of the Sino-US-Pak collusion in operation since early seventies wanted to resume friendly relations with China through seeking a permanent settlement of the border dispute. India, thus, realizing it as a major security compulsion, required to normalize her relations with China for ensuring peace in the sub-continent. Friendship with China was assessed to put Pakistan at peace by lessening her aggressiveness and this was the factor which made India interested in solving the border problem with China on a permanent basis. Because in view of 'China's stance towards the sub-continent, the question of Pakistan continues to loom large and cast its shadow on Sino-Indian relations'⁷².

The only material progress towards the normalization of bilateral relations during the Janta regime was the unfreezing of India-China boundary question. The Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs said that there is now 'improved understanding of each other's view point'⁷³. With reference to India's External Affairs Minister's visit to

China the report added 'The discussions with Chinese leaders succeeded in unfreezing the India-China boundary question'⁷⁴. While discussing the international situation in the Rajya Sabha on May 16, 1979, Bajpai clarified that his visit to Peking was at Chinese initiative and he expressed the hope that 'Sino-Indian relations may continue to be 'free of friction' on the basis of Panchsheel'⁷⁵.

But, despite India's sincere efforts China could not prove herself fair on her part towards the process of normalization. Her strategic perception about the sub-continent and her policy according to that very perception could not create healthy norms needed for bilateral normalization. A nine-member Chinese team visited Pindi in the month of May to seek new ways for helping Pakistan's defence industry with material and expertise. On May 21 a Chinese official pledged his country's continued co-operation for the development of defence production in Pakistan⁷⁶. This action on the part of China was naturally to undermine the prospects of bilateral normalization since the Chinese interest in enhancing the defence capability of Pakistan was quite contrary to the ultimate security interests of India.

Similarly, there could not take place basic changes in Chinese attitude and antagonistic behaviour regarding the

issues specifically related to India. The issue of Kashmir, as it is known, has been the basic point of difference as well as hostility between India and Pakistan and Chinese support to Pakistani stand on Kashmir resulted as a major irritant in deteriorating the Sino-India relationship. Despite the fact that a considerable progress was made towards the bilateral normalization during the Janta regime the Peoples China, on her part, did not extend the genuine co-operation for this purpose. It appeared that she was yet, interested to keep the irritants alive. The Chinese Vice Premier Li-Hsien-Nien, during his visit to Pakistan in July 1979 expressed his country's support to the right of self-determination in Kashmir⁷⁷. This again indicated Chinese anti-India policy in the sub-continent. The reference to Kashmir by China marked her pro-Pakistani stance and it was not at all conducive to the atmosphere of mutual co-operation.

Summing up the Janta phase of Sino-Indian relations it can be concluded that Chinese behaviour has been ambiguous in this concern. She only wanted to formalise her relationship with India to counteract the Soviet influence in the sub-continent but at the same time she wanted to retain the depth of her relations with Pakistan. In spite of the fact that the border issue was the crucial factor obstructing the normalization, China always tried to set it aside during the bilateral conversations. Moreover,

she did not leave her old tilt for the border issues. In the new 'Reference Book' China reiterated her old claims for the Indian territory⁷⁸. This makes it abundantly clear that China has been intentionally avoiding the discussions over the border problem and that she was not willing for permanent settlement through resolving the complicated issues. It appears that as per strategic perception China wanted to keep her military co-operation with the United States and Pakistan operative in South Asia against the friendly association of India and the Soviet Union.

The Janta Government was voted out of power in the elections of December 1979 and the Congress Party was reinstalled under the leadership of Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi also realized the dangers involved in the Sino-US-Pak collusion. In an interview with the French Radio at Paris she said on January 10, 1980 that the 'Sino-American military - co-operation would be very dangerous for India and for entire region'⁷⁹. Yet, despite China's non-co-operative attitude India remained keen for normalizing the relations with that country. The President N. Sanjiva Reddi, while addressing the Joint session of Parliament on January 23, 1980 said 'India remains willing to discuss all issues with China including the boundary question in search of a solution based on equality'⁸⁰.

THE NEIGHBOURING IMPACT

PAKISTAN

The Janta Government in India too, realized the fact that peace and stability in the sub-continent was subject to the good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. Pakistan's established relationship with the United States, although fading out during the Carter Administration⁸¹, and her growing strategic closeness with the People's China endangered the security environment in the sub-continent. China's strategic endeavour with Pakistan in South Asia posed a direct threat to India's security. This was a relevant security compulsion before the new Janta Government which made it willing to establish stability and depth in India's relations with Pakistan in the background of Simla agreement of 1972.

India, therefore, offered a 'no war-pact' to Pakistan with the object of giving stability to the relationship on the bilateral basis. India's External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari Bajpai observed in the Rajya Sabha on April 4, 1977 that the 'no-war-pact could form the basis of a stable peace in the sub-continent'⁸². The External Affairs Minister told the House that a similar pact was offered to Pakistan eight years ago but there had been

no positive response from Pakistan⁸³. India's offer of 'No-war-pact' this time also did not result in a satisfactory return from Pakistan. The latter avoided to sign it with the condition to include the Kashmir settlement. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmad said that a 'no-war-pact' could be considered only if it involved a settlement of the 'Kashmir dispute'⁸⁴.

In the first week of July 1977, the military regime resumed power in Pakistan. The Chief Martial Law Administrator Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, talking to newsmen in Kuwait on November 2, said 'Pakistan wanted to live in peace with all her neighbours including India'⁸⁵. It appeared that the military ruler in Pakistan was interested in establishing good neighbourly relations with India. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq said that his country would continue the process of normalizing relations with India within the framework of the Simla Agreement⁸⁶.

For strengthening the bilateral relations a visit of the External Affairs Minister Bajpai to Pakistan was settled in the first week of February 1978. Speaking over the prospects of his visit to Pakistan at Hyderabad on January 29 the External Affairs Minister said, that his visit would turn a new leaf in India-Pakistan relations⁸⁷. Bajpai's visit, however, materialized with no purposeful

return. Although the External Affairs Minister assessed it as creating a 'better climate of understanding'⁸⁸ but this was, in fact, a good will visit with no formal agenda having been drawn for discussions⁸⁹. The issue of Kashmir loomed as a dominating theme throughout the discussions at Islamabad. Pakistan argued that the settlement of the Kashmir issue was an essential condition for the resumption of the process of normalization within the purview of Simla accord. The External Affairs Minister Bajpai made it clear that Kashmir was an integral part of India, yet he, assured Islamabad that his Government abode by the Simla accord. While clarifying the position of Kashmir under the Simla provisions the External Affairs Minister observed '..... solution of the Kashmir question was to succeed, not precede, full normalization of relations'⁹⁰.

But, despite the process of normalization going on Pakistan did not deprive herself of the irritants which were ultimately deemed to obstruct the path to soothing relations. Pakistan's 'efforts to acquire arms'⁹⁰ from other countries including the United States was one of the major irritants. The US policy makers increased their extra interest in Pakistan in the wake of the leftist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 and the fall of Shah of Iran, for, Pakistan was perceived to be used as a base to provide support against Soviet designs in Afghanistan as well as in

any situation of crisis in the Gulf. So far India was concerned her security interests were to be directly affected by Pakistan's increasing armaments. The construction of Karakoram High Way as the result of the active co-operation of Pakistan was another important irritant. The 800 Kilometres long road starting from Havelian Rail Head, 60 miles north of Islamabad, to Gilgit, links Kashgar connected with the Chinese road-network in Sinkiang province. Construction of this road was a matter of serious concern to India since it was taken to affect the over all security arrangement in the north-western and northern sector. The External Affairs Minister, Bajpai reacted in the Lok Sabha on July 21, 'Apart from the illegality of the construction of the Highway, this development also has serious strategic implications for the region'⁹².

The bilateral trade per agreement of 1975 was one of the important source of intensifying linkage between the two countries. But the snags were put in the trade-linkage also because of Pakistan's 'huge deficit in its balance of payments with India'⁹³.

Pakistan was reported to have left CENTO in March 1979. Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Advisor, Agha Shahi commented that the decision was taken 'in the light of the new realities as a result of which the alliance had lost its relevance to Pakistan's security concern'⁹⁴.

However, this decision was welcomed in India as it was in the 'interests of peace and amity in the region'⁹⁵.

The Janta Government, no doubt, tried its best to establish close friendly relations with Pakistan but the latter did not co-operate equally in the process. The bilateral relations could not improve to the desired extent so as to defuse the tension in the sub-continent and strengthen peace in the region. Although, President Zia-ul-Haq, in his address to Non-aligned Conference at Havana on September 6, 1979, said that 'Pakistan was actively engaged in the task of developing relations with its neighbours on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence'⁹⁶. He further claimed, 'Our relations with India have improved and we will continue to expand the areas of co-operation on the basis of mutual benefit'⁹⁷. President Zia-ul-Haq expressed his desire to settle the Kashmir dispute within the framework of UN Charter and the Simla accord. General Zia-ul-Haq laid greater emphasis over the settlement of Kashmir. Talking to Indian Journalists at Havana he observed that Pakistan is determined to seek the resolution of the dispute.... in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the spirit of the Simla agreement. A just and peaceful solution of this problem will usher in a new era of co-operation and amity in South Asia'⁹⁸.

Actually the atmosphere of mutual trust regarding the sub-continent remained as an unattainable dream. The reason behind it has been the dual policy followed by Islamabad. On the one hand President Zia talked about improving relations with India for the sake of sub-continental amity and peace but on the other he actively worked for military superiority against India.

The difference between words and deeds of Pakistan has been the cause of mistrust between the two nations. Pakistan's nuclear policy, too, is one of the important factors which hindered the way to further good neighbourly relations. On August 28 President Zia-ul-Haq said that his country was resolved for acquiring nuclear energy for peaceful purposes⁹⁹. He said that Pakistan would acquire nuclear technology as it was necessary for the economic development¹⁰⁰. Despite Zia's announcement for peaceful utilization of nuclear energy the reports confirmed that Pakistan was making efforts to manufacture nuclear war-heads. India's Prime Minister, Charan Singh said, 'The Government had reports that Pakistan was trying to make a nuclear bomb and if these reports were true then India might have to revise its nuclear options'¹⁰¹.

Overtly, Pakistan wanted to convince New Delhi, that the nuclear programme was for peaceful technological purposes.

Gen. Zia-ul-Haq had written a letter to Prime Minister Charan Singh putting up a proposal for joint inspection of each others nuclear facilities¹⁰². Similar suggestions he had made to former Prime Minister Morarji Desai. In his forty minutes meeting¹⁰³ with India's External Affairs Minister S.M. Mishra at Havana on September 3, 1979 Gen. Zia-ul-Haq assured him about Pakistani nuclear programme as it was not for obtaining weapons capability. He further expressed his belief in nuclear non-proliferation and also making Indian Ocean a Zone of peace.

But in India's perception Gen. Zia's various policy announcements regarding the Pakistan's nuclear programme were to camouflage the weapons technology which was possibly being developed. The possibility of nuclear weapons being developed by Pakistan had deeper implications over the security horizons of India. Speaking over the Pakistan's nuclear issue in the Lok Sabha on March 30, 1979 the External Affairs Minister Bajpai had observed 'The possibility of Pakistan developing explosion capability is of understandably grave concern to India¹⁰⁴. So the nuclear issue involving the security interest of the nation could not be foregone and the process of bilateral normalization was naturally to be affected.

Since the time Janta Government had resumed office much was expected in the sphere of bilateral normalization.

The Government of India tried her best to improve relations with Pakistan within the framework of Simla accord of 1972. However, the main irritant, continued as Pakistan repeatedly raised the Kashmir issue in various regional and international forums. Developing closer co-ordination with China Pakistan handed over the disputed territory in Azad Kashmir to her for constructing the Karakoram Highway. No attempt to discuss these issues bilaterally was made. Moreover, there has been obvious lack of reciprocity on the part of Islamabad despite eagerness expressed by President Zia-ul-Haq for resumption of friendly relations with India. Addressing the joint session of Parliament on January 23, 1980 President, N. Sanjiva Reddy said '....the Government proposes to continue on the course set in motion by the Simla agreement of 1972. We hope that the Government's policy will be reciprocated in ample measure'¹⁰⁵.

The Janta Government under Charan Singh lost the mandate of the people and Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in January 1980. But there was no change in the course of foreign policy. The normalization process continued per guidelines of the Simla agreement. The impact of relationship with Pakistan during Mrs. Gandhi's period was predominantly adjudged still in relation to the security environment in and around the sub-continent.

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CONCLUSION

Since, this fact has been established that foreign policy denotes the behaviour of a state with other states in the international system in order to achieve, maintain or maximize the ultimate interests - the concept of foreign policy making, therefore, is influenced by certain factors, e.g., geo-strategic and geo-political factor, material factor, human factor, internal political factor, constitutional factor and moral factor. These factors will differ from nation to nation and from time to time.

The option for non-alignment as a foreign policy strategy by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, the architect of free India's foreign policy, was too, in consonance with the broader treatment of these factors. Nehru visualised the nations prime interests and the global political circumstances and adhered to the concept of non-alignment as a best-suited foreign policy to suit India's interests and attain global peace.

Obviously, the global system as a whole is a changing phenomenon. India's non-alignment is not a static-idealistic principle, but it is a practical dynamic approach to the

inherent national problems arising out of the changing patterns of behaviour in the international system.

As it is evident from the broader analysis of the subject that the security compulsions from time to time basically influenced the course of India's foreign policy, hence, this is also an established fact that foreign policy is a changing phenomenon.

An apparent conclusion has been drawn through the security oriented analysis of the subject that an overall security structure of a nation needs good foreign policy and a nation's military power is a bi-product of a good economic structure which is also related to good foreign policy.

The non-alignment as free India's foreign policy strategy, due to its emphasis over global security and peace, has often been confused as an idealistic policy. But, since it is accepted that environment of peace is necessary for around developments of a nation's power potential into actual and available national power. Non-alignment, therefore, testifies to this realistic approach in the basic paradigm of India's foreign policy.

In fact, the non-alignment constituted a dynamic approach in the global system with a view to serve overall interests of the nation, both short term and long term.

The security compulsions sprang out of the bi-polarisation of power that came into being after World War Two and the creation of pro and anti communist blocs. In the South Asian region too India chose to remain non-aligned whereas Pakistan was sucked into the system of military pacts with USA.

Therefore, the major security compulsion before India in the decade of fifties was the process of growing US-Pak military relationship since 1950. The United States in view of her global objectives vis-a-vis USSR chose Pakistan as the most suitable frontline state for the containment of communism. The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed between the United States and Pakistan in September 1954. Hence, the US involvement in the sub-continent compelled India in her security interest to pursue the policy of non-alignment and creation of sphere of peace around her more vigorously. The signing of Panchsheel with China in May 1954 and Bandung conference of 1955 were the results of such an effort.

The Sino-Indian relations, however, deteriorated in the early sixties due to the Chinese territorial ambitions

resulting in Chinese aggression of India in October 1962. Since, India was not militarily prepared to face the Chinese territorial adventure, her immediate need was the procurement of military weapons which she was able to get from USA. The immediate compulsion-need was, thus, met. However, the unilateral cease-fire announced by China on November 20, 1962 left the entire Northern and North-eastern frontier of India (totalling about 22500 sq. miles*) in dispute which gave rise to many other compulsions.

Pakistan was quick to take advantage of Sino-Indian conflict and actively cultivated friendly relations with China. Thus, putting a ring around India of antagonistic neighbours- to the east East Pakistan, to the north China and to the west West Pakistan. India had to break or weaken this link. The Sino-Russian relations at this point of time were antagonistic. USSR was concerned over American influence in Pakistan so near to her border. India, therefore, in her own security interests developed her relations with the communist giant USSR. Till May 1964 the Soviet military aid to India amounted \$ 130 million. The so called pro-Soviet shift in India's foreign

* China occupied 24500 sq. miles in Ladakh and 8000 sq. miles in NEFA - quoted in the Sino-Indian Dispute, (Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, New Delhi, July 1964), p. 24.

policy after 1962 was the result of security compulsions which were inherent in growing Sino-Pak collusion and American military aid to Pakistan.

The United States continued the supply of arms to Pakistan in pursuance of her military parity policy in the sub-continent. The injection of multitude of arms to Pakistan ultimately resulted in Indo-Pakistani conflict of September 1965. Although the conflict ended with marginal gain for India but she, in view of the American regional strategy, felt the security compulsion which forced her to improve the relationship with USSR. Tashkent agreement of January 1966 was the result of that compulsion. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri could not achieve much on the negotiating table due to the obvious Soviet pressure. However, the Tashkent agreement formed the basis of Indo-Soviet relations in the years to come.

Even after Tashkent agreement India's relations with the United States continued on normal lines till 1968 but no depth in bilateral relations could be established due to Nixon's 'Asian Doctrine' which in nutshell aimed at undermining Soviet influence in the continent, cutting India to size, adding military strength to Pakistan and normalize relations with the People's China. India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi perceived the regional implications of Sino-US-Pak triangle in making and as an alternative approach she

opted India's foreign policy structure on pro-Soviet lines. This was again a major security compulsion which was responsible for strengthening Indo-Soviet relations in the late sixties.

During the first half of the seventies India's relations with the Soviet Union developed to a considerable extent. In the wake of the climax of the crisis in East Pakistan in the mid of the year 1971 American politico-military support to Pakistan in collusion with China posed a serious threat to India's security and this grave security compulsion left Mrs. Gandhi with no option except to review India's relations with USSR in the context of new strategic implications. The signing of Indo-Soviet friendship treaty in August 1971 was obviously a security oriented approach in the formulation of India's foreign policy.

India's relations with the United States, however, could not improve to the point of satisfaction during the period from 1971 to 1976. The underlying snags in the process of strengthening bilateral relations were - US proposal for 'balanced relationship' - which ultimately aimed at undermining the relevance of Indo-Soviet treaty to India's disfavour in South Asia, arms supply to Pakistan, militarization of the Indian Ocean and finally India's peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974. During this phase the

basic factor, which impeded the process of Indo-US relationship, has been US arms policy to Pakistan. In view of her broader security perceptions India could not compromise her interests on this issue and the bilateral relations remained even below the point of normalcy.

As a result the Indo-Soviet relations gained depth during this period. Soviet communist party Chief Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi in November 1973 added new dimensions to the bilateral relationship. Increased bilateral collaboration in the field of commerce, science and technology is on record during the period from 1974 to 1976.

But this should not be observed as an 'one-sided' approach by India to cultivate the friendship with the USSR. In fact, the USSR was also in the strategic need of establishing her position in South Asia to counteract the American influence.

So far India's relations with Peking are concerned they did not improve till 1975. The basic reasons behind it were India's growing intimacy with Moscow on the basis of Friendship Treaty of 1971 which was termed by Peking as 'anti-Chinese alliance' and Chinese years old relationship with Pakistan which was calculated to be more advantageous in global perspective than the friendship with India. In February 1975 with the coming of Chinese Table Tennis Team to New Delhi some betterment in bilateral relations was

expected but no substantial improvement could be marked due to the lingering border dispute and Peking's persistent attempt to infuse insurgency in North-eastern India.

The Indo-Pak relations were, although, normalized through the Simla agreement of June 1972 but no satisfactory improvement could take place in the spirit of Simla because of Islamabad's continued efforts to obtain more and more sophisticated arms against India. Since the injection of sophisticated armaments in sub-continent was ultimately to jeopardize the regional security environment, India could not negotiate on this point and relations remained, however, unreconciled. Moreover, there was no change in Pakistani attitude regarding the basic issue of Kashmir. Her reaction to Sikkim's merger with India and the PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) issue were quite uncompromising. The basic issue between India and Pakistan was latter's persistent attempt to augment the weaponry which formed the inherent security compulsion before India and she reviewed her policy with the USSR in the mid seventies.

When in March 1977 Janta Party - a political mix of different ideologies-rightists and leftists-came to power, it was common apprehension that the new Government might bring changes in the nature and course of country's foreign Policy. But the new Government also declared to follow the basic postulates of non-alignment as India's foreign policy.

Regarding India's relations with the United States much was expected towards the improvement of bilateral relations because of President Jimmy Carter - a democrat-being in power. But, in due course, certain issues came to fore which impeded the prospects of good relations. The important of them were, e.g. US proposal for international inspection and signing of the NPT, military activities in the Indian Ocean and intensification of arms supply to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in December 1979. By January 1980 the US decision to supply arms worth \$ 550 million to Pakistan and latter's demand for another \$ 5 billion military aid to build up defences supposedly against the USSR posed a serious threat to India's security and therefore, formed an impediment in the betterment of Indo-US relations. This was an inherent compulsion before the Janta Government which again strengthened pro-Soviet lines in the course of India's foreign policy practice.

India's relations with the Soviet Union too, considerably improved during this phase. The induction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan on the invitation of Leftist Government there created new sets of political and strategic implications. India, as a non-aligned country and supporter of Panchsheel was expected to condemn the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. She did it in a qualified manner

stating that India was against the presence of foreign troops on any land and such troops must withdraw. But she qualified her statement by adding that the countries responsible for creating such conditions in Afghanistan should also simultaneously stop interfering in other nation's internal matters. Obviously the reference was to USA, Pakistan and Iran's support to Mujahidins. Establishment of a secular non-aligned Government in Afghanistan was in favour of India's security interests. Establishment of a fundamentalist Government which Pakistan and Iran seek to establish there is totally against India's security interest in view of her large Muslim population. Pakistan on the other hand was quick to exploit the situation in Afghanistan to procure more and more sophisticated arms from the United States in the pretext of facing communist aggression from north. The arms so procured were far in excess to her professed need in the north. Moreover, certain type of arms and equipment was not suited to the terrain in that sector.

In India's perception Pakistan on the one hand was seeking to establish pro-Pakistan Government in Afghanistan through the Mujahidins with massive arms aid from USA. On the other hand Pakistan, under the pretext of helping the Mujahidins in the interest of her own security against aggression from the north was in reality procuring arms which

could only be used against India. Therefore, India's security compulsions indicated a policy of neutralizing Pakistan moves firstly by advocating the need of a political settlement in Afghanistan without interference by outside powers and secondly trying to stop the inflow of such sophisticated arms in Pakistan through diplomatic channels, which could pose a danger to India's security and at the same time gear up her own defence preparedness. Out of the security compulsion India abstained herself from openly condemning Russian presence in Afghanistan. Her increased defence needs against the huge induction of armaments in Afghanistan had to be met. Russia was a willing supplier and she agreed in May 1980 to supply defence equipments worth Rs.1300 crores.

The improved US-China relations and closer defence link between Pakistan and the United States brought three power axis, China-Pak-USA, closer to Indian frontiers. The Janta Government at Delhi sought to neutralize this by initiating the normalization-process with China. But China, due to compulsions of her own, wanted to put the border issue with India in cold storage for the time being, and at the same time keep the negotiations open in other fields of relationship. Obviously China did not want the situation to hot-up on both Russian and Indian front at the same time.

Whereas, for India the border settlement with China was the primary objective of her reconciliation efforts.

In the context of existing political and strategic environment the Janta Government saw the urgency of trying to improve her relations with Pakistan. The External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Bajpai visited Pakistan for this purpose in February 1978. Besides reiterating the spirit of the Simla agreement and resolving to act for improvement of better relationship nothing concrete was achieved by the Janta Government in its efforts. The issue of arms procurement by Pakistan, construction of Karakoram Highway, her nuclear policy and raising the Kashmir issue at various international forums still remain the hurdle in Indo-Pak relations. It compelled India to embark on arms procurement and manufacture as a counter to Pakistani military threat and similarly to take steps for the improvement of Indo-Pak relations in the spirit of Simla agreement. These factors still continue to influence the formulation of India's defence and foreign policy.

APPENDIX - A

MUTUAL DEFENCE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT 1954
(Between the Governments of Pakistan and the USA)

The Government of Pakistan and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in support of those purposes and principles;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full co-operation to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to participate in United Nations collective defence arrangements and measures, and to obtain agreement on universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate guarantee against violation or evasion;

Taking into consideration the support which the Government of the United States has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed:

ARTICLE

1. The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts mandatory or supplementary thereto, appropriation acts thereunder or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its

legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required or used exclusively for the purposes for which originally made available will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person, not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or services received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.

5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this Agreement.

7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Pakistan will so deposit, segregate or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization, or government.

ARTICLE II

The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain necessary security safeguards.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government of the United States rupees for the use

of the latter Government for its administrative and operative expenditure in connection with carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such funds.

2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance.

3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by, or on behalf of, the Government of the United States for the common defence effort, including expenditures for any foreign aid programme of the United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish procedures satisfactory to both Governments so that such expenditures will be net of taxes.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Pakistan, operate as part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States, the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the senior Army, Navy and Air Force Officers and their respective immediate deputies.

2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personnel or of their families and will take reasonable

administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families.

ARTICLE V

1. The Government of Pakistan will:

(a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;

(b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;

(c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;

(d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and

(e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

2. (a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such other governments as the Parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as may be agreed upon, in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security.

(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, or raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Pakistan.

Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.

ARTICLE VI

In the interest of their mutual security the Government of Pakistan will co-operate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with

nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

ARTICLE VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4 and arrangements entered into under Article I, paragraphs 3, 5, and 7, and under Article II, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.

2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th day of May one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four.

For the Government
of Pakistan:

Zafrulla Khan

Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Commonwealth Relations.

For the Government of the
United States of America:

John K. Enumerson

Charge d'Affaires a.i, of
the United States of America

APPENDIX - B

PAK-US BILATERAL AGREEMENT OF CO-OPERATION 1959

The Government of Pakistan and the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958;

Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the parties signatory thereto agreed to co-operate for their security and defence, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America in the interest of world peace, agreed to co-operate with the Governments making that Declaration for their security and defence;

Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;

Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is associated with the work of the

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major committees of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955;

Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Affirming their right to co-operate for their security and defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan;

Recognising the authorisation to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East; and

Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of Iran and Turkey respectively,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.

ARTICLE II

The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Pakistan such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the

Government of Pakistan, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

ARTICLE III

The Government of Pakistan undertakes to utilise such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America in a manner consonant with aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Pakistan and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan will co-operate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this Agreement.

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ARTICLE V

The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the co-operation between the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the other Government to terminate the Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this 5th day of March, 1953.

S.M. Hassan

For the Government of
Pakistan.

Fletcher Warren

For the Government of the
United States of America.

APPENDIX - C

TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION 1971
(Between the Republic of India and the USSR)

DESIROUS of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

BELIEVING that the further development of friendship and co-operation meets the basic national interests of both the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world.

DETERMINED to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism.

UPHOLDING their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence and co-operation between States with different political and social systems,

CONVINCED that in the world today international problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict,

REAFFIRMING their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter

The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side,

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HAVE decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India:

Sardar Swaran Singh

Minister of External Affairs

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A.A. Gromyko,

Minister of Foreign Affairs,

who, having each presented their Credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each party shall respect the

independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive co-operation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE II

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

ARTICLE III

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples of in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co operation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

ARTICLE V

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field for achieving those aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings

and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE VI

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

ARTICLE VII

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

ARTICLE VIII

In accordance with the traditional friendship

established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE IX

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

ARTICLE X

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered

into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XII

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

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Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in
the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

On behalf of the
Republic of India

(Sd.) Swaran Singh

Minister of External
Affairs

On behalf of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

(Sd.) A.A. Gromyko

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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